Georgia, located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, has infamously been named the “beacon of liberty for this region” by former US President George W. Bush in 2005, and the country has long expressed its aspirations to become a member of the European Union (EU). As part of this path to integration, Georgia must adhere to certain democratic principles, including upholding media and press freedom. However, in recent years, concerns have been raised regarding the Georgian government's commitment to these fundamental values. This article delves into the state of media and press freedom in Georgia, highlighting the case of Georgian journalist Nika Gvaramia, to shed light on how the government's actions have hindered the country's progress towards its EU aspirations.

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia was seen as a prime example of the post-Soviet space moving away from authoritarianism toward democracy while seeking rapprochement with the EU. Georgia was much celebrated by both the EU and the U.S. for its progress in democratizing the country. With its accession to the EU Eastern Partnership and its aspirations to join the EU, the country also committed itself to upholding standards of press and media freedom.

Indeed, Georgia has made significant strides towards democratic reforms since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the country’s record on press freedom has been marred by several issues, including media ownership concentration, political bias, and limited pluralism. The vibrant media landscape that gradually emerged after the Rose Revolution in 2003 has increasingly faced challenges that have hindered the development of a truly independent and diverse press. 

The Fragile Development of the Georgian Media Landscape

In the first year after the Rose Revolution, in 2004, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) recorded a drop of more than ten points and more than 20 places (73rd to 94th) in the ranking. This was mainly due to the fact that the leader of the Rose Revolution and third President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, initially had two TV stations and several newspapers closed down and awarded several media formats to pro-government figures. Already under the pro-European Saakashvili regime, there was concern that a media monopoly would increasingly emerge. Already then, the Georgian media landscape was a battleground for the power elites. 

However, press freedom scores slowly improved under Saakashvili, especially in 2006 and 2007, when Georgia moved up 10 and 23 places in the rankings, respectively. With the closure of the critical TV station Imedi and the Russo-Georgian in 2008, Georgia fell again by a full 54 places in the ranking. However, from 2009 on, the country's press freedom scores slightly rose again. In the last year of Saakashvili's government in 2012 and the following years under the new Georgian Dream government, the country's press freedom scores stagnated for a long time. In the last two years, however, RSF has noticed a sharp decline in Georgia's press and media freedom, with a slump being recorded in 2022, when Georgia fell a full 29 places in the ranking.

Such a backslide has led to the fact that in 2023 it will no longer be Georgia (77th place) that leads the press freedom rankings in the South Caucasus but Armenia (49th place), and thus George W. Bush’s old designation of the “beacon of liberty for the region” is now seriously in question. 

Georgia’s EU Ambitions Are in Doubt     

Even though the current government still officially adheres to its EU aspirations and applied for EU membership in 2022, in practice, the Georgian government does not sufficiently follow the principles and guidelines for integration into the EU. This was also assessed by the EU, which did not grant Georgia, unlike Moldova and Ukraine, EU candidate status in 2022. 

More and more, the question arises whether the Georgian government is really still striving for EU membership and whether it has not long since broken with its previous EU aspirations. Not only is the current government exerting increasing pressure on Georgia’s media, but it also seeks rapprochement with Russia, which has become even more evident since Russia’s war in Ukraine. While the political West is distancing itself from Russia, Georgia is “excessively flirting” with Russia, as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace puts it. 

Suppression of the Georgian Press Along Russia’s Lines     

The weakening of press freedom and the rapprochement with Russia are mutually reinforcing. Georgia has once again become one of the main target countries for Russian media influence, and at the same time, state regulation of Georgia's media landscape resembles much of how the media landscape in Russia was gradually monopolized. The manner in which media and press freedom are being suppressed in Georgia is very similar to how the free press and media in Russia have been muzzled, notes Mariam Gersamia, media project manager at Transparency International Georgia. She says that the Georgian state is now conducting a media capture, where laws are instrumentalized to homogenize the media. One legal charge that journalists are particularly often brought to court on is defamation, Gersamia notes. One of many examples is the mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, who sued Pirveli TV and journalist Maia Mamulashvili for defamation on the grounds that Mamulashvili publicly stated that Kaladze had received a significant quantity of money from only one public procurement tender. As a result, the Tbilisi City Court ordered the TV channel and Mamulashvili to pay 15,000 GEL (ca. 5190 EUR) as a payment for moral damage to Kaladze.

Gersamia presumes that the large number of such alleged defamation cases inflicts reputational damage on opposition media formats so that they are no longer perceived as credible by the general public. The goal, she says, is both emotional and reputational damage, as well as encouraging journalists to self-censor. The 2017 Media Sustainability Index also confirms that many Georgian journalists self-censor so as not to antagonize political or religious forces, the latter being a major pillar of the current government. Gersamia notes that there are now almost daily cases of journalists being punished by the state's interpretation of the law. It is all “wonderfully orchestrated”, the project manager says sarcastically. 

In the context of the Russian war in Ukraine and freedom of the press in Georgia, it is also noteworthy that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Georgia has been accepting Russian citizens who want to leave Russia practically without limit, but in the meantime has already denied entry to at least eleven Russian journalists from Russian opposition media outlets. This is quite remarkable, as the Georgian government only  took the highly controversial decision in 2020 to restore a visa-free regime for Russian citizens coming to Georgia, but at the same time deliberately denies entry to individual Russian journalists who speak out against the Russian government and Russia’s war in Ukraine. Such denials of entry to Russian opposition figures therefore seem like a handout from the Georgian government to the Kremlin.

Yet what Georgia is left with in this downward spiral is a very active and well-organized civil society, focused primarily on Tbilisi. When the Georgian government tried to push through a law reminiscent of the Foreign Agents Law in Russia, only civil disobedience prevented this endeavor. Yet, this law also shows how civil society and especially the media in Georgia are increasingly under attack.

The Findings of the Reporters Without Borders Report 2023

One other key challenge to media freedom in Georgia, noted by RSF, is perceived political interference. The government's influence over media outlets, both directly and indirectly, raises questions about impartiality and independence. The concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few powerful individuals with close ties to the ruling party further exacerbates concerns regarding editorial independence.

Gersamia’s concerns are also echoed in the report: instances of self-censorship among journalists have increased due to concerns about backlash and potential repercussions. Journalists face various forms of intimidation, including physical attacks and legal harassment, which contribute to a chilling effect on media freedom. A recent physical attack on Misha Mshvildadze in June 2023, co-founder and host of the opposition television channel Formula TV, only confirms this trend. 

The Controversial Case of Nika Gvaramia

The year 2022, when RSF noted a significant decline in media and press freedom, is also the year in which Nika Gvaramia, a media figurehead in Georgia, was arrested and sentenced to prison. RSF ran him as a journalist in political prison in Georgia until his pardon a few weeks ago.

Nika Gvaramia is a well-known figure in the Georgian media landscape, serving as the General Director of Mtavari Arkhi, a prominent television channel known for its critical stance towards the government. Gvaramia’s journalistic career and his influence within the media industry made him a target for scrutiny and potential political maneuvering. Gvaramia is indeed a controversial figure in Georgia. His harsh criticism of the government as well as his style of reporting certainly met with opposition. It was not uncommon for Gvaramia to publicly use invectives against the government and to voice radical statements. His previous  TV channel Rustavi 2 also received a lot of attention in 2019 when news anchor Giorgi Gabunia drifted into a one-and-a-half-minute hate tirade against Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russian     language. Gvaramia is also said to have close ties to the currently imprisoned former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, which may have made him even more of a thorn in the government’s side.

According to the government’s narrative, Gvaramia’s arrest was based on allegations of misappropriation and abuse of power during his tenure as the head of Rustavi 2. The authorities claimed that Gvaramia was involved in financial irregularities and embezzlement within the media organization. From their perspective, the arrest was a legitimate action taken against corruption and malpractice.

However, many critics argue that Gvaramia’s arrest was politically motivated, aimed at silencing a critical voice and weakening independent media. They point to the timing of the arrest, which occurred shortly before the parliamentary elections, as evidence of an attempt to suppress dissenting opinions. Critics argue that the charges against Gvaramia were exaggerated or even fabricated with the intention of discrediting him and tarnishing the reputation of Rustavi 2. Gersamia also calls the case “politically motivated” and notes that Transparency International has published seventeen statements in support of Gvaramia.

While the government’s claims of financial irregularities cannot be dismissed outright, it is crucial to consider the potential motives behind Gvaramia’s arrest. Some argue that the charges against him may have been politically influenced, but that does not necessarily mean they are entirely baseless. It is plausible that Gvaramia’s actions, even if not imperatively criminal in nature, could have raised legitimate concerns about the management and financial practices at Rustavi 2.

An Unexpected Pardon

All the more surprising was the news that Georgian President Salome Zourabishvili pardoned Nika Gvaramia on June 22, 2023 – a decision that was certainly unexpected but that Gersamia welcomes wholeheartedly. 

While this pardon still cannot be clearly assessed, there is a suggestion that Georgia’s drift in the press freedom rankings brought too great an outcry in Georgia, so that the authorities wanted to appease civil society again with the release of Gvaramia. At the same time, Gvaramia’s release fits into the image that the Georgian government has been portraying for years: a back-and-forth between the EU and Russia. Perhaps this is the position that the Georgian government would like to claim for itself: a pivot between the West and the East while benefiting from both sides. 

However, another scenario is also possible, which could feature an internal power struggle in Georgia. The former French diplomat and current Georgian President Salome Zourabishvili was always considered more Western and liberal than Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. While it was often perceived that Zourabishvili’s political stance was much more liberal than that of the rest of the Georgian government, the criticism was that, in the end, she did not act on her statements. It is conceivable that she has now really asserted herself. If this is the scenario that holds true, then it will be interesting to see in the future where internal disagreements between Zourabshvili and Garibashvili might move.

In the meantime, the possibility of a European future for Georgia could be decided, from which, however, Georgia is increasingly drifting away. Stable freedom of the media would be an important step toward EU rapprochement, as it is one of the 12 points that the EU sets as a condition for granting Georgia EU candidate status. Gersamia notes that these 12 points could certainly be met in practice, but that there is a lack of political will. And as long as there is no political will, Georgian independent journalists have an uncertain future.

Contributed by Svenja Perersen