About author: Ziya Kazimzada is a Research Fellow at Milliyyet Research Center and now doing his master degree at Masaryk University

The Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan brought major changes to Baku's attitude towards domestic politics. After the war, Azerbaijani authorities began working on the replacement of old-school, corruptive incumbents with European-educated, young, and meritocratic personnel more loyal to Ilham Aliyev and his team. Domestic politics have changed as a result of the conflict's partial resolution, with a stronger emphasis now being placed on economic growth and the country's reconstruction efforts. The administration has started a series of large-scale economic and infrastructural initiatives with the goal of reviving the country and luring international investment. 

Start of a new era in Nakhchivan

Recent months witnessed major political and economic developments, especially in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Starting from December 2022, Azerbaijani state-controlled media, members of Parliament, and officials expressed their dissatisfaction with the leadership and autonomy of Nakhchivan, as well as called on the government to set up a more centralized system in the Autonomous Republic, taking into account its broad power in the region since the dissolution of the USSR, which leads to a  lack of control over the exclave. The discussion over the autonomy of Nakhchivan created heated debate and controversy among Azerbaijani MPs and sparked social discontent among some Nakhchivan residents. Moreover, even though in December 2022 Vasif Talibov, the chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, traveled to Baku to discuss recent developments in Nakhchivan, clarify judgement from Baku towards his rule in the Autonomous Republic, and meet with Ilham Aliyev to discuss the controversial issues, there were reports that the Azerbaijani President refused to meet him. Notably, before that, Vasif Talibov refused Baku's invitation twice, which asked the Nakhchivani head to travel to Baku and discuss contentious topics that the central authority wants to discuss.

To understand Talibov's rule in Nakhchivan and his understanding of authority, one should consider Talibov's ambitions historically. It seemed that at the initial stage, Talibov aimed to become the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan. After 2003, Talibov, who could not realize this dream during the time of the late President Heydar Aliyev, began to seriously work for that post. After 2002, a lot was written in the country's press about those who wanted to become prime minister. The name Vasif Talibov was often found in those headlines.

Beginning in November 2022, the Azerbaijani government started a series of detentions, operations by the Azerbaijani State Security Service, and the abolition of Nakhchivani local independent and autonomous bodies.  On November 1, Azerbaijan’s Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan abolished its State Security Service structure, and it was replaced by the newly formed Nakhchivani branch of Azerbaijan’s State Security Service, which exerts Baku's initial attempts to dismiss the region's autonomy and connect it under Baku's umbrella. After nearly 3 weeks, Baku continued its fight against mass corruption in Nakhchivan and arrested several relatives of Talibov serving in major positions, especially Nakhchivani Minister of Finance Rafael Aliyev. They were accused of embezzling EUR 116.7 million, EUR 79.1 million, and EUR 72.5 million respectively which contains 70% of Nakhchivan's total budget, and it exerts a level of corruption in the Autonomous region even by junior incumbents. Interestingly, after the detentions, Azerbaijani Finance Minister Samir Sharifov said that the subsidy allocated to Nakhchivan from the state budget for next year would be reduced by EUR 17.6 million. Given that most of the Nakhchivan's annual budget comes from Baku, calls from Azerbaijan's authorities to invite Talibov to Baku and receive an explanation about the corruption level were the preliminary factor that led to the resignation of Talibov. Particularly, APA, the Azerbaijani pro-governmental media agency, reported that Vasif Talibov was not allowed to use the presidential exit of the airport for the first time. 

Additionally, Baku launched replacement waves, starting with Nakhchivani Interior Minister Rashad Ismayilov and Suleyman Nematov was approved as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, strengthening Baku's control over local bodies. Furthermore, the central replacement was Fuad Najafli's appointment as Baku's representative of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, who was serving in Pasha Holding, which is known for its close ties to the ruling family. Most notably, as an indicator of Baku's unhappiness towards Talibov's rule and the corruption rate, the official statement mentioned that "Ilham Aliyev instructed Fuad Najafli as an authorized representative to take care of people, fight against corruption, bribery, and transparency, implement the right personnel policy, and work in close contact with the central executive authorities." 

The main motives behind Baku's tendency to take control

Turning to the main motives of Baku's attitude towards Nakhchivan, recent detentions, and ministry abolitions, one question arises: Why is Azerbaijan trying to take full control of Nakhchivan now? What are the main motives behind the recent decision by Aliyev and his administration?

Politically, preparations for cancelingthe status of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan are accelerating. In addition to many issues, the new Constitution will most likely change the country's administrative-territorial division, and the newly created 14 economic regions (including Karabakh, Eastern Zangezur, and Nakhchivan) will be transformed into an administrative-territorial unit. Baku hopes that this will also be a factor that will speed up the political, economic, administrative, and social integration of Armenians living in Khankendi/Stepanakert into the country. 

Furthermore, speaking about the development of the regions of Azerbaijan in 2019, President Ilham Aliyev said that personnel and structural reforms would be implemented. Unlike governors of other regions, Vasif Talibov strongly reacted against personnel reforms in Nakhchivan, and personnel sent from “continental” Azerbaijan were not welcome in the autonomous exclave. 

After the war, Ilham Aliyev repeatedly sent a message to the international community and Armenia that the region of Nagorno-Karabakh would have no special status. Referring to this, no other territory of Azerbaijan should have a different status so that the international community cannot demand the same from Baku with regard to Karabakh under the pretext of the autonomous status of Nakhchivan. Also, canceling Nakhchivan's autonomy would provide Azerbaijan with direct control over the region and allow it to better secure its borders. This could be seen as necessary to address security concerns, particularly in light of tensions with Armenia and Iran. The latter frequently claims Nakhchivan to be its historical part and has a broad intelligence network that provoked the enclave's population against Baku.

Economically, in terms of China's "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative and other regionally planned projects, there are three ways that connect Asia and Europe. The majority of the transportation was passing through Russia, which is now isolated by the West and is not able to fully implement its role as a transit country. Also, the Iranian option is followed by political controversies with the United States and European countries, and even though it is the best option in terms of railway transportation and quality, its ability is dismissed amid political crises. 

The “Zangezur Corridor” project is a crucial transportation route that would connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the idea of the corridor was highly prioritized by Baku, which presents the Zangezur Corridor as a significant addition to the OBOR initiative as it provides a link between the countries of the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region and acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The new corridor would create new trade and investment opportunities for countries in the region and help to increase economic cooperation and integration. Given that there is already an alternative route passing through Georgia, Azerbaijan could diversify transportation routes, reduce dependence on Tbilisi, and save on additional spending from transition fees. In terms of this, Azerbaijan tries to take control of Nakhchivan and implement reforms because otherwise, it will pave the way to disbelief among Asian and European partners, taking into account the enclave's despotic rule, which the Helsinki Committee named Azerbaijan's “Dark Island.” The reduction or even cancellation of Nakhchivan's autonomy will strengthen Azerbaijan's position as a transit country in the region, providing alternative transportation route for countries in the region and lowering the country’s dependence on other transportation routes.

Socially, the region also faces several social problems that can impact the well-being and quality of life of its residents. Despite the region's strategic location and important role in regional trade and commerce, many residents still live in poverty with limited access to necessities such as clean water, adequate housing, and quality healthcare. This causes a number of problems in society, such as high unemployment, low levels of education, limited opportunities for personal and economic development, and social unrest. One should notethat after Talibov resigned, taxi drivers held a protest in Nakhchivan, claiming that during the time of Vasif Talibov, taxis had to be only locally manufactured NAZ Lifan cars. "These 20,000 manat-worth [EUR 11,000] cars were sold to us for 35,000 manats [EUR 19,000]," one of the protesters said, which shows social dissatisfaction towards Talibov's rule.

To sum up, the events in Nakhchivan are not only a reflection of the Azerbaijani government's efforts to tackle corruption and improve governance but also a demonstration of its determination to strengthen its control over the autonomous republic. The replacement of local officials and the creation of new institutions under the authority of the central government are seen as steps toward the centralization of power in the region. The situation in Nakhchivan highlights the delicate balance between regional autonomy and central control in Azerbaijan. It is important for the Azerbaijani authorities to find a solution that satisfies both the need for good governance and the desire for future projects, as well as economic and political developments.