As the new order emerges in the South Caucasus, plans for new security arrangements appear to be picking up the pace. Iran, Turkey, and Russia are increasingly active in offering their visions for the security in the region. Initiatives often differ, but they nevertheless have one unchangeable constant – exclusion of non-regional actors.

Security initiatives for the South Caucasus usually follow large-scale geopolitical cataclysms. The second Nagorno-Karabakh war was one of such developments. For instance, during the conflict itself Iran offered not only to serve as an intermediary and as a space where peace negotiations should be held, but also unveiled a 3+3 initiative. The platform aims at including three small South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and three big neighbors – Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Iran’s then-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Seyyid Abbas Araghchi toured the region holding meeting in each capital of the five countries.

A similar initiative was subsequently advanced by Ankara. At first, Russia was hesitant to support the ideas as it did not want either Iran or Turkey get to play a bigger role in the conflict resolution process. However, throughout 2021 views in Moscow seem to have changed. The Kremlin is now more supportive, albeit preserving a cautious attitude.

As argued above, it is not the first time similar initiatives have been proposed – attempts were made in the 1990s and following the Georgia-Russia war of 2008. Their failure was primarily caused by the fact that Moscow and Ankara at the time had not had a significant rapport with each other. Relations with the West were also stable and perhaps more beneficial to each of the powers.

The 2010s were in many ways defining in that they showed deepening tensions between Russia and Turkey on the one hand and the collective on the other. As both Ankara and Moscow turned to seek balance to their relations with the West, the two countries’ interests, despite multiple differences, began to align. The South Caucasus is one of the areas where Russia and Turkey compete, but also share similar geopolitical understanding – regionalism. The latter is also a central element of the Iranian approach. The regionalism is a result of the changing global order, and it involves a very specific approach to the problems in such regions as South Caucasus, Black Sea, or Central Asia. The underlying logic is to address arising challenges without the interference from non-regional powers. Usually, the latter are Western powers and since Iran too experiences pressure from the US, Tehran is much supportive of the regional approach.

Thus, though the three powers Eurasian powers have been historical foes for centuries and the potential for them cooperating in creating a common vision for a certain region have been always questions, the troika cooperated successfully in Syria and the South Caucasus may well appear to be yet another space for an order exclusion.

Challenges for 3+3

Obstacles for the implementation of the 3+3 initiative vary and range from problems between Turkey, Iran, and Russia to unwillingness of smaller countries to participate in the platform. True, nowadays there are many incentives for the three powers to find a common ground in the South Caucasus: the troika is interested in sidelining external players (mainly the West) from the region. It should be also mentioned, however, that Turkey, in contrast to Russia and Iran, is not interested in the West’s total exclusion from the region. The West’s minimal presence in the South Caucasus is important to Ankara as it helps the country to balance Russia’s ambitions. Without it, Turkey will struggle to contain Moscow’s increasingly militarized foreign policy.

Moreover, recent flare-up of tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan highlights the fragility of cooperation in the region. This relates to the differences between Turkey and Iran as the latter is increasingly worried about Ankara’s growing military and economic power in the South Caucasus and the forays in the Caspian. Indeed, following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war Turkey has made interesting moves into the Caspian region and Central Asia.

Yet another obstacle to the initiative is Georgia’s unwillingness to participate. Russia’s occupation of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions is a primary cause. The country which pursues NATO and EU membership and considers becoming institutionally part of the West as a historical mission fear the diminution of its chances if Russia manages to impose the 3+3 order on the South Caucasus.

There is little minimal potentially positive effect if Georgia participates willingly or is forced to join the platform. The net result is that facing Russia alone without the Western support will doom Tbilisi’s chances to re-integrate the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region and is likely to derail Georgia’s NATO/EU integration hopes. Moreover, it could also pave the way for greater wave of illiberalism in the country. Pursuit of liberal democracy could be derailed, which in the end could lead to drastic changes in Georgia’s foreign policy.

Russia and Iran would receive greater benefit. Both are especially intent on blocking the external, non-regional players. It would strengthen its economic and political position in the South Caucasus and remove alternatives to Russian vision of the geopolitical order. Tehran would be also supportive of this platform as the Islamic Republic fears Western influence in the region.

Therefore, the 3+3 platform is an efficient tool for Moscow to close off the South Caucasus from the collective West. The Kremlin wants to achieve it with the help of other regional powers – Iran and partially Turkey. Moscow aspires to build what call be called a hierarchical order where Russia is a primary player but will acknowledge basic interests of Iran and Turkey. Much will depend on Turkey, though, which is not interested in a complete sidelining of the West. Rather Ankara’s foreign policy is more nuanced and is based on maintaining balance in the region where none of the powers should be gaining the upper hand. No less important is Georgia’s position, which fears Russian pressure and exclusion of the West from the arrangement.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.