Turkey’s support for victorious Azerbaijan in its latest war with Armenia have much greater ramifications. Azerbaijan is now increasingly seen as a springboard for Turkey to reach out to Central Asia where Ankara taps into its significant cultural leverage, along with Central Asian states’ willingness to diversify their foreign relations away from Moscow and Beijing.

The second Nagorno-Karabakh war had one unexpected result. Turkey’s outreach to Central Asia have significantly improved. This is not to say that Ankara has not tried building closer ties with the region dominated by kindred Turkic-speaking countries before 2020. Following the Soviet collapse, Ankara made significant efforts to penetrate Central Asia. However, it was hampered by the lack of adequate resources as Russian security guarantees and rising Chinese economic presence were powerful disincentives. Now, however, there is a renewed emphasis on extending Turkish influence in the region.

Long term reasons vary. Ankara seeks greater position in Central Asia as the country needs more diversified sources of energy. Although major gas finds in the Black Sea were announced in 2020 by the Turkish government, the country still largely depends on external energy supplies. Hence, finding new sources of energy and ensuring that neither Russia nor Iran has a monopoly on energy transportation corridors is a major geopolitical concern for Turkey.

Turkey also regards the Caspian Sea as a critical part of the Middle Corridor. The latter is intended to complement Beijing’s massive Belt and Road Initiative. Both initiatives are essentially complementary. For instance, in 2015, Ankara and Beijing signed a memorandum of understanding on aligning the two initiatives. Turkey does see the Middle Corridor as an important way to build bridge with Central Asia. In late 2020, trains were sent from Turkey to China and back using the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars route for the first time.

Here Azerbaijan’s position is important to Turkey. The latter facilitated Turkey-Turkmenistan agreement signed in January 2021. The deal aims to jointly develop the Dostluk (Friendship) gas field under the Caspian Sea. Turkey also hosted a trilateral meeting with the Azerbaijani and Turkmen foreign ministers in February. Here Turkey looks at the progress around Dostluk as it could potentially remove a significant roadblock to the implementation of the much-touted Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP). Energy interests again play a leading role in Ankara’s moves. Ideally the TCP could allow gas flows through the South Caucasus to Europe.

This is an issue where Turkey will face resistance from Russia and Iran as both countries’ interests align in preventing Turkmenistan from sending gas to Europe. Turkmen gas could indeed be a powerful competitor to Russian gas in the European market, but to achieve any meaningful results in carrying out the TCP, Turkmenistan would need big powers’ support and Turkey could one of such. Much of it remains hypothetical but clearing of some roadblocks is indeed an important development.

Much of Turkey’s ambitions in the Caspian and Central Asian regions are based on the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency in 1991, which aimed at increasing cultural and economic ties, as well as the Turkic Council established 2009. The latter has been officially changed to the Organization of Turkic States following the decision made during the latest summit in November 2021.

There is also a purely geopolitical momentum behind Turkey’s thrust. While China and Russia loom large in the region, Turkey exploits Central Asian states’ desire to diversify their foreign relations away from Moscow and Beijing. Dependence on either power has at times caused trouble in regional capitals. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are in need of cash, increasing the potential for Turkey’s economic penetration.

Another interesting component of Turkey’s vision for the Caspian Basin and Central Asia is that it dovetails with the West’s strategy toward Russia and the two regions. This creates the potential for cooperation between Turkey and the West and further emboldens Ankara to act more actively in the wider Caspian region.

Constrains

Despite this momentum to re-engage the region, Ankara also faces constrains. Limits on Turkish power endangered the country’s position in the region in the 1990s. Nowadays, Turkey is more confident, but challenges remain. Relations with China are crucial components here. Despite numerous attempts by China to establish stronger ties with Turkey – including investment in industry, energy, transportation, and telecommunications – significant deals have not materialized. The synergy between the Middle Corridor and BRI has yet to be established.

Another significant limit is that the Caspian basin and Central Asia are essentially closed off by larger neighboring powers. In the Caspian Sea, Turkey’s active diplomacy and occasional military drills together with Azerbaijan unnerves Russia and Iran, though both tend not express their fears publicly. Indeed, the Caspian Sea is regarded by Tehran and Moscow as an area of their near exclusive activity. The 2018 Caspian Sea treaty regulated that the littoral states should not allow any non-regional state’s military activity. Thus, to substantiate its growing ambitions with concrete moves Turkey needs to act carefully to not cause resistance from Russia and Iran amid the shift in the West’s attention away from Western Asia to the Indo-Pacific region.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.