Georgia expects the European Commission’s assessment on whether the country will be granted candidate status. The first question one may ask is whether Georgia has a good chance of being anchored in the EU enlargement process. The second question is why is this important at all. 

To address both questions, Caucasus Watch reaches out to Ambassador Natalie Sabanadze, who headed Georgia’s mission to the EU from 2013 to 2021. We find her in London. She is a Senior Research Fellow at the Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme. She remains optimistic that Georgia will remain on the European integration track, which she hopes means the country can continue to progress towards democratization.   

The benchmark set by the European Commission to Georgia has been reduced to 12 points. Ambassador Sabanadze believes the government intends to address these points but not in good will.  The political climate is volatile. Georgia is a “winner takes all” political system, with a majoritarian system in which the opposition does not really have much scope for influence. Georgian governments tend to collapse rather than rotate, and there is only a single case of a peaceful transfer of power. For years, political platforms tend to be personalized rather than driven by political movements. Politics seems to be focused more on personal attacks rather than policy debates. However, it will have to do. Keeping Georgia engaged now is the priority. 

Ambassador Sabanadze reflects not only on Georgia’s EU candidacy but also its significance. Of course, Georgia can carve out a trajectory outside the EU. The price will be becoming a worse place to live. Georgia used to be the frontrunner of democratic reforms in the region. There is now a perception that the style and substance of policy in Tbilisi is changing. Ultimately, this is not merely a question about the project of European Integration, but first and foremost about Georgia.  

A number of politicians linked to the ruling party, including the mayor of Tbilisi, are confident that Georgia will meet the 12 conditions set by the European Commission and Georgia will receive candidacy status. As Georgia’s former Ambassador to the EU, do you share their confidence?  

It is worth reviewing the basis of that confidence. The official line reiterated in Tbilisi is that the 12 points have been met and what is pending is the decision by the European Commission. The problem is that this position has been put forward for a while now, including during Joseph Borrell’s visit (September 7, 2023), when he said very clearly that more work needs to be done. 

I have the feeling that the government’s assessment may diverge from the Commission’s overall evaluation. However, I am optimistic that the EU will show lenience and acknowledge progress. I do not think they were expecting Tbilisi to take on board every recommendation. As it often the case, they want to see movement towards the right direction. 

My reason for optimism – because, of course like everyone else I hope that Georgia will be granted candidate status – is founded less on the performance of the government, which leaves a lot to be desired, and more on the fact that the EU will be seeing Georgia as part of a bigger picture. That bigger picture looks at Georgia in a regional and largely comparative perspective, particularly in relation to Moldova and Ukraine. No one is meeting the set benchmark 100%.

In terms of progress, Moldova is arguably doing better than the three on a political level. Enlargement is a package. And that package includes the Western Balkans, which includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia – that already has secured candidate status, and we can be critical of that – and you have Ukraine. Georgia being two steps behind in comparative perspective looks problematic. 

There is also a kind of “moral pressure” on Brussels, as the Georgian public has displayed sustained commitment to European Integration, despite government rhetoric. In previous years the project of EU integration was fully endorsed on every level. Now, that is not the case, but public opinion appears to be reliably pro-European. The March events, with the young generation taking to the streets with EU flags are also a clear indication of where public mood lies. So, you want to give them an encouraging signal. 

So, the challenge for the EU is to project a positive message that nods to public sentiment without hailing the government’s political stance. And that is a challenge that will require careful working. If the EU candidate status is not be granted, the challenge will be to retain connection and commitment to this public, so that there is a better public understanding of the decision. The government will no doubt argue that “we are not where we should be, perhaps, but we are better than others in comparative perspective,” and that is likely to resonate with public opinion. That would entail putting forward a clearer conditionality. 

If we don’t get this candidate status, this will not be the end of the world, but I do think it is very important that we do get it. This will anchor Georgia to the process, as opposed to where we are now, which is merely a promise. From then on, it will be important how reforms move. Of course, the EU is a nice club with nice benefits, but its primary value is the transformation of the country into a European democracy. 

So, you are more optimistic than many people in the opposition. So, Georgia will either get an EU candidacy status or not. However, do you find the 12 conditions reasonable? Is it reasonable to discuss about “polarization,” when one looks at the political landscape in the EU? Is it reasonable to talk about “de-oligarchization” in Georgia, while Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, and others have been granted candidate status? Does the ideal of an “EU candidate state” have any grounding on reality on the ground you feel? Is it reasonable?

Starting on the question of “optimism.” I have tried not to dig deeper into my contacts in Brussels. My assessment is mostly based on my understanding of the process and its logic. Perhaps, things will not go smoothly. But, if we get candidacy status, this will be conditional, with caveats, and qualified. 

On the question of “being reasonable.” I think, on the whole, the 12 recommendations are reasonable, at least the 10 of those are reasonable. The 12 points, overall, address immediate challenges. When I or anyone else reflect on democratic backsliding, we think in terms of these 12 points, focusing on where the quality of democracy has deteriorated and suffered. So, addressing these issues is a reasonable expectation and does contribute to improving democratic standards. 

In Tbilisi, we have a hybrid regime: a fragile democratic façade that is all about consolidation of power, the undermining of institutional independence, control over judicial authority, and the appropriation of state resources. That is very much like Hungary, and it is no accident that Tbilisi and Budapest are best friends. So, if you ask Tbilisi.

The 12 recommendations correspond to real needs. So, to expect Tbilisi to fulfil those 12 recommendations, one has to assume that the current government is ready to self-destruct, which they are not. To expect the current government to go beyond a box-ticking exercise, in good faith – is unreasonable. So, there will be some effort to be seen to be meeting these 12 expectations, “in some way.” 

Had you seen the government’s “de-oligarchization” bill, which passed after two readings and caused such an outcry, received fierce criticism from the Venice Commission and then was dropped, you would see how a good recommendation framed too broadly can be counterproductive. And here I agree with your implicit skepticism. 

Indeed, the “depolarization” and “de-oligarchization” requirements were the two points that were framed too broadly. As a result, the government was able to draft a bill that contradicted the substance of the recommendation, undermining human rights standards. So, the Venice Commission had a look and said that “this is a blueprint for witch-hunt and the further suppression of the opposition, it is highly personalized, and it’s going to be a disaster.” 

So, what I am saying is that this regime is not interested in the substance of the reforms, and I believe this was not “a misunderstanding.” They were actually told, “forget de-oligarchization,” because should you fulfil all the other expectations, the desired effect would be achieved anyway, as a residual systemic effect. Instead, they copied someone, I think Ukraine, creating an instrument to suppress opposition. So, they will try to tick the box but what drives them is the desire to secure candidate status as an electoral resource. 

De-polarization is the same problem. It is harder to define the phenomenon and measure it. The obvious way around this problem is to refer to the consultations with Charles Michel. This was somehow put aside. The initial agreement then was specific and referred to power-sharing, dialogue, and other tangible steps. You could do that: you could change your language and how you describe your opponents, how you engage with organizations you don’t like, etc. However, they did not want to engage with the substance and perhaps it was too much to expect that they would. 

Of the political priorities highlighted by the European Commission, where do you feel Georgia has made greater progress? 

In many areas there is partial progress. There is also full progress: gender violence, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, addressing issues arising from the European Court of Human Rights rulings, etc. Everything else it is a matter of deciding whether the glass is half full or half empty, depending on how you want to look at it. 

On de-polarization, there has been backtracking. That is conscious. It is clear the authorities do not share the conviction that there needs to be de-polarization. Of course, the opposition needs to also play ball. I am emphasizing the government because they should be taking the initiative, even in order to say that they did attempt to address the challenge. They didn’t. 

On another positive note, compared to Moldova – and this is not in the spirit of Moldova-bashing, which I find unacceptable – I would say we are in a better standing institutionally. I would say that objectively Georgia is more prepared: the implementation of the DCFTA of the Association Agreement, the civil service is working, and we are moving in the right direction. Moldova has the right political spirit that is winning the day in Brussels, but weaker state capacity, which ultimately does the heavy lifting.

So, depolarization is Georgia’s weak point.

Yes, it is and there is no objective reason why this should be the case. Public opinion is simply tired of that. In politics we refer to two kinds of polarization: issue and identity based. 

There is healthy issue-based polarization that is substantive, acceptable, and necessary: to build or not to build a park, for instance. These are legitimate debates.

But we have identity-driven polarization, where no matter what you say, the problem is “you.” We are throwing labels on parties, people, NGOs, and media platforms without engaging with what they say. I engage with who they are, not what they say. And this is going on for years. That is radical. It has always been part of Georgian politics, but it is becoming increasingly toxic and is undermining democracy, because we have “enemies” rather than political competition and real dialogue. Small things make a big difference. Stop calling people names would help. It’s not that difficult.

EU candidacy usually goes hand in hand with assistance for reforms, so money. Given the Association Agreement in place, what is Georgia in danger of missing if it misses the candidate status? Is the effect largely symbolic?

Politically, the impact would be substantial. If we don’t get the candidate status, the EU will lose leverage over the Georgian government. I am certain they will say “we did everything that was to be done, this yielded nothing, so stop lecturing.” The political class will dig their heels, push back, and there will be less cooperation. Politically, it will not be wise although the decision needs to be weighed.

Georgia as a result might disengage itself from the West. In a forthcoming article for Carnegie, I argue that democratization in Georgia was always linked to foreign policy objectives. Now, there is a cooling of pro-Western agenda, and we are shifting gear towards the so-called multi-vectoring. Our position on the war in Ukraine is closer to that of the Global South than EU member states; we are again speaking about closer ties with China, etc. In terms of foreign policy this “pivot” to multi-vector approaches is likely to continue and, domestically, the drive for democratic reform will lose momentum.

For a small country like Georgia “every little helps.” However, putting aside the money and technical support, the main loss will be political. Hypothetically, if you have a government that wants to do well for Georgia – wants fair elections, wants to depolarize – then the assistance that will come will make a difference. 

That is not where we are with this government. And they might look to compensate loss of face elsewhere. China for instance. 

The Georgian government accuses the opposition of undermining Georgia’s EU candidacy. Is there any merit to this accusation? There seems to be a perception that the NGO sector is integrally linked to the opposition and is, therefore, articulating a distorted view of reality on the ground. I have heard similar accusations in countries your referenced: North Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere. What is that about? 

The similarities are incredible, but I am not sure where they are routed. In Brussels the dilemma is how to meet popular expectations without being seen to reward the government. I remember that a Georgian journalist asked me precisely the same question. My answer then, and my answer now, is that to assume that the European Commission and 27 member states with their Embassies in Tbilisi, decide based on what the President Salome Zourabichvili or NGOs are telling them is simply ridiculous. That’s not how things are done.

Civil society can be harsh and unfair, as can be media platforms. In a democracy, you just deal with it. I am sorry, but that is part of the game. Is not that the essence of democracy?  

Georgia is a small place, with personal connections. Tbilisi is a small village. You can reach out to people and have a normal dialogue. But the effort is not there. There was once a state minister for European Integration, who was very effective. That was a nice guy, he engaged with NGOs, and I never heard anything bad about him and NGOs were grateful. It is doable. 

The Georgian government suggests that the PM’s (Irakli Garibashvili’s) visit to Hungary, his speech at Europe’s foremost conservative political forum, and the visit to Tbilisi by PM Orban is part of a broader lobbying campaign designed to deliver EU candidate status.  Do you see the political approximation between Budapest and Tbilisi as helpful in that respect? 

So, the thinking seems to be that joining a bunch of Eurosceptics is somehow helpful to gaining the EU candidate status. 

There is ideological approximation. That is clear. The Georgian Dream is not the same party that came to power. It shifted to the right, in a place championed by Putin and is closer to Le Pen and Orban. They have embraced the ideology of traditional values, gender polarization, church politics, etc. They bemoan how difficult it is to be Christian, and that sort of conservatism. This ideological shift should not be underestimated. This has nothing to do with the EU. Lobbying for the EU in that entourage is crazy. 

And they echo Orban, sharing the same talking points. Hungary is the EU’s biggest headache. So, to choose Budapest as your champion lobbyist is strange. We have no other friends left. We lost all our traditional friends, and we are left with Hungary. What Hungary appears to offer, I feel, is that they can blackmail the rest of the EU to frame Georgia with Ukraine. To say, in other words, “we will not let you progress with Kyiv unless you progress with Tbilisi.” Alright, this might work once, but it’s not likely to get you into anyone’s good books. So, there is a question of motive here.

This ideological shift should not be underestimated. The participation in that forum was indicative of that shift and participating in a forum with Euro-sceptics is not.

The EU Annual Survey suggests that 54% of Georgians still hold positive views on the EU. Is the EU still a politically viable project in Georgia? Should Georgia not receive EU candidate status, “what’s next” for the country? 

Well, what’s our alternative? The alternative is to be in the gray zone we have been, where we did not like it. We never knew when we would be bullied by the big guys in our region. It’s a rough area. The idea was to get out of that zone, not least for security reasons. Giving up on the EU and NATO does not automatically give us an alternative.

The protagonists will change. We can lean more on Turkey and Azerbaijan, China, perhaps rather than Russia. Going regional may be a choice, but… It will not be good for democracy.

Demographically we will shrink as people will be leaving, as they already do. Our security will deteriorate, and we will need to submit to the will of others. 

The idea behind the EU, for small states like Georgia, is that you pull sovereignty together to ultimately save it. Going alone means we will ultimately lose sovereignty. “What do you value is the question”: system of governance, rule of law, freedom of speech. I would also like to be in a position to change government, if I don’t like it, and being treated as a citizen that is able to affect change. These are things I feel are significant. 

Georgia’s biggest connection to the single European market is Turkey. Do you feel that Tbilisi’s close partnership with Ankara is a good approximation or alternative to EU integration? 

I don’t see any good alternatives to EU membership. You may have close relations with Ankara to balance Moscow, but that is old style politics. Georgia is small and must always be ready to compromise unless we work in the EU. 

We have to work well with Turkey, and we cannot afford to fight every big neighbor. They are in NATO and supportive of our candidacy. We cannot afford to fight with every big neighbor. Together we built on regional connectivity and with Azerbaijan and Turkey we work well on transport and energy. But, culturally and historically, Georgia is not like Azerbaijan. There is a strong foundation to our partnership, but it is not an alternative. 

Ultimately, we don’t need to be in a club where super-majorities and super-concentration of power erodes democracy. We do not need to do more of the same. Better be in a club where pulling together sovereignty enhances your democracy.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis