There is an intellectual iron curtain cutting across Europe, even as capital, goods, and people manage to sideline sanctions. Russia is not open to the West, and vice versa. Ukraine is the wall dividing Europe, but the emerging landscape is nothing like the Cold War. There is multipolarity, with every state differentiating its posture somewhere on the continuum between East and West. An increasing number of states aspire to sit on the fence. 

Trying to look at the Caucasus from the Russian side of the fence, we reach out to one of the most respected (in the West) analysts in Moscow, Sergey Markedonov, who is the leading researcher at the Euro-Atlantic Security Centre of the MGIMO Institute for International Studies. Prior to the war in Ukraine, or what is referred to in Moscow as “Russia’s military operation,” there were very few Caucasus area study analysts that did not refer to his work if one was looking for a Russian systemic analysis that was informed by key stakeholders, incisive, and without the blurring of overtly ideological commitments. 

As the war evolves, we reach out to engage with the same question. At a point in time where trust in intellectual integrity is sinking, a discussion with Professor Markedonov may be a lifeline. 

Is it fair to say that the significance of the Caucasus for Russia is higher now than before the war in Ukraine? We went from the backwaters of the Near Abroad to a main logistics hub. 

The Caucasus is central to Moscow’s security calculations. Russia is home to millions of members of the Caucasus Diaspora, both Armenian and Azerbaijanis. We have the biggest Armenian diaspora in the world and the second-biggest Azerbaijani. Whenever there is tension in the Caucasus, including Karabakh, there are domestic implications over here. And Russia’s Northern Caucasus territories are greater than the South. 

The significance of the region for transport is also significant, particularly during this period of confrontation with the West. The region is perceived as a window to Eurasia. Indeed, one could say the region’s significance is multi-dimensional and includes security, identity, and economic development. 

Regarding this multi-dimensional significance, would you say the war in Ukraine changed the Russian perception of the region? Beyond logistics, would it be fair to say that Russia is stepping back from the role of a hegemon to engage in a Concert of Three in the region, with Iran and Turkey, in a more symmetrical mode?      

I can agree in part with this assessment. Azerbaijan was able to capitalise on the situation in Ukraine to change the status quo. That is clear. Of course, Russia has also re-prioritised its posture in the region. Previously, Armenia was partner number one, but, as a clear consequence of the Ukrainian developments and Western sanctions, Turkey and Azerbaijan are more significant.

However, 2022 is not a point of inflection for the emergence of a concert of power or a balance of power. The Second Karabakh War of September 2020 clearly demonstrated the role of Turkey. True, in the aftermath of the war, Russia launched a unique peacekeeping operation whose significance was recognised even in the West. Russia was seen as a positive force in this context, despite disputes over Ukraine or Moldova. But Turkey did play a new role. 

Furthermore, Azerbaijan never gave up on the idea of reconstituting its sovereign territory. Ukraine was not a watershed in that respect. Let us go back to the brief period between August to November 2008, when Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Initially, Baku claimed sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, but there was more or less silence for three months. Then, President Aliyev gave an interview to RAI, where he asserted his determination to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, if necessary, by force if negotiations failed. Even prior to 2020, Azerbaijan articulated certain claims over Armenia proper (numerous mentions of lost primordial Azerbaijani territories transferred to Yerevan’s control). The “Zangezour corridor” was not discovered as a term, neither in 2020 nor in 2022. 

I would also say that Ukraine was, to some extent, “inspired” by the success of Azerbaijan in 2020. I would even say that the conflict in Ukraine – the biggest event in Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union – was, in some respects, affected by the Second Karabakh War. The ongoing armed confrontation in Ukraine,of course, has a catalytic effect across the board: Armenia is “de-Russifying” its foreign policy, Georgia is diversifying its foreign policy, Azerbaijan pushed forward with the consolidation of the territorial status quo. The latter development created several challenges for Moscow, as no one was interested on a second Caucasus front. 

So, the Ukrainian developments did not change everything but sharp ended a series of pre-existing trajectories in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s surging economic and military ambition so evident in Karabakh remains the problem for Moscow, as it encouraged Kyiv to take a more assertive stand in the Donbass, triggering the special military operation. Ankara’s and Baku’s success encouraged Ukraine. 

I am now finalising an article (co-authored with the Iranian colleague) on how Iran perceives Turkey in the South Caucasus. Turkey is perceived as part of NATO. Turkey remains the second biggest standing military in the Alliance. Ankara stands behind Azerbaijan militarily. Therefore, Iran is suspicious, and Tehran is creating its own red lines. It is no accident that Iran opened a consulate general in Kapan, located in the southernmost Armenian province of Syunik, in what appears to be a direct message to Azerbaijan and its backer, Turkey. Thus, Iran is painting its own red lines. 

Since 2022, the world has been witnessing the standoff between Russia and the West in Ukraine. There had been differences between Moscow, on the one part, and Washington and Brussels, on the other, before it. Their most striking manifestation was the “five-day war” of August 2008 in the South Caucasus and consequent disputes over Georgia. Then the case of Crimea and conflict in Donbass became the focal points of the Russia-West rivalry. 

However, when it came to Nagorno-Karabakh, uniquely in the Eurasian space, there was Western-Russian cooperation. The USA and EU supported peacekeeping operation under the Moscow’s auspices.  In the eve of the Brussels negotiations in 2021, Charles Michel reached out to Putin twice, as well as President Macron of France. They were consulting Russian President on the handling of trilateral statements between himself, Aliyev, and Pashinyan. Moreover, they were trying to coordinate their own activity with Russia. 

One further effect of the Ukrainian dogma in 2022 was the freezing of the Minsk OSCE Group. Since, we have parallel efforts to encourage a peace treaty. That is paradoxical because both Russia and the West recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and treat the Peace Treaty between Yerevan and Baku as the crucial point of the South Caucasus security and stability. However, the engagement of the mediators has different strategic objectives: Russia wants to assert its relevance in the region; the West makes the case that Russia failed as Armenia’s security provider and promote decreasing of the Moscow’s presence in the region. The clash in this sense appears to have an existential significance: you cannot cooperate with Russia if you vilify your opponent like “aggressor and dictator.” I am sure this approach emphasising “the battle of values” is not productive. That is why we see growing complexity in the South Caucasus. A concert might have been desirable, but now I see competition. 

Do you see competition between Russia, Turkey, and Iran? What about the three plus three format? That looks to be productive.

Speaking about competition, I mean the growing disagreements between Russia and the West over the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Previously, this rivalry was limited by the Georgian direction, but nowadays the whole South Caucasus has become the competitive arena.

As for the three plus three format, it looks interesting because it is based not on abstract values but on pragmatic reasons. At the same time, it frames an interesting form of competitive cooperation. The three parties are interested in diminishing the role of the West. That is particularly true for Russia, but also Turkey is in agreement. Turkey is tired of being lectured by the West. Ultimately, however, Turkey is a member of NATO. Erdogan likes to play up Turkey’s self-sufficiency and nationalism, but where it matters, he takes predictable steps: he greenlighted Finland’s NATO member and is likely to also approve Swedish membership. Turkey wants to be a hub between Europe and Central Asia and play the role of the “honest broker” between Russia, Ukraine, and the West. 

Let me turn, once again, to the Russian role in the Caucasus. There is a domestic discussion in Armenia on whether Yerevan estranged Moscow or Moscow abandoned Yerevan, “re-prioritising” its relations after the war in Ukraine. What does this debate make sense of to you?      

Armenia has seen a generational change of guard. Pashinyan is the first leader of Armenia who learned Russian as a second language. Sargsyan and Kocharyan were native speakers, bilingual. Ter-Petrosyan was part of the Soviet academic elite. Kocharyan made a career in Karabakh, where Russia was more welcome as the common language between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, particularly in a period where Baku was trying to diminish the space for Armenian culture. Pashinyan was sixteen when the USSR collapsed. The intellectual figure symbolising the U-turn in Armenian foreign policy, Armen Grigoryan, was about eight at the time. Allen Simonyan, the current Chairman of the National Parliament, was eleven. These “new guys” are less connected with the campaign for Karabakh and less committed to Russia as well. 

Of course, the idea of “complementarism,” or looking beyond Russia, was first articulated by Kocharyan’s foreign minister, Vardan Oskanyan, whose first foreign language was English rather than Russian. I knew him for years; he never spoke Russian to me. Pashinyan is sharp-ending trends that were not unknown in Armenian foreign policy thinking. At some point, this line of thinking leads to the idea that Karabakh weighs as a problem rather than an advantage on Armenian interests. This reflection has profound consequences and has triggered a debate within the Armenian community that predates 2020 and 2023 by many-many years. The Armenians saw Karabakh as central to their national identity but came at the cost of two closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as extreme dependence on Russia and, by the way, Georgia, the main conduit for 75% of import-export flows.

Russia’s reprioritisation in the South Caucasus (especially after 2022) has been enabling Pashinyan to make this shift. Pashinyan could argue that he was a champion of Karabakh, and in the extraordinary elections in 2021, he campaigned on the promise to recapture Shusha. When he addressed an Armenian audience, these were his promises. But as Russia did not support Yerevan in maintaining the link between Karabakh and ‘Mother Armenia,’ he argued that the responsibility lies with Russia. “It’s not me, it’s Russia” made for a better account of what was happening. Of course, these issues are much more complex and are more intrinsically linked to the Armenian identity. However, Pashinyan’s reasoning is clear: he wants to assign full political responsibility onto Russia. 

I would like to focus a bit on southern Armenia, Syunik. Since the Trilateral Statement, the Russian FSB force stationed along the Armenian-Iranian border has been growing. There were 4,000 troops at some point. That force has been there throughout encounters between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces and did not play a role. What is their mandate? What is their mission, if not to prevent a change in the territorial status quo? 

We need to place this question in a wider context. It is more or less usual for Russia to postpone difficult decisions. Let me compare the Russian posture there with our position in Georgia between 2004 and 2008. Saakashvili did a lot to change the status quo. He provoked the Russian peacekeeping force, the military, and political leaders. And he was visible working in coordination with NATO and the EU. Russia waited for four years before reacting to Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali, that triggered a Russian reaction and, subsequently, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The situation in Karabakh is directly comparable. 

Prior to 2022, the West recognised Russia’s exclusive role in Karabakh as a moderator. Even President Macron and Charles Michel, President of the European Council, phoned President Putin to confer on how to push reconciliation. Russia secured a trilateral statement (January 2021) to unblock transport and communication, delaying a final settlement of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan had not agreed on this status point but did not actively object. However, the evolution during 2022 provided Azerbaijan with an opportunity to move towards “salami tactics.” One slice at the time, moving onto Lachin.

Looking at Azerbaijan’s position in Syunik in 2021, one could consider this in the context of slow or delayed Russian reaction time. Russia’s unpleasant reactions are often postponed. However, after the events of September 2022, Armenia concluded that hoping for a Russian reaction might be futile and is possibly better to turn to the West. That was, of course, the choice of Armenian leadership. I am not going to blame anyone, because it is not my place. To criticise Pashinyan, I should be Armenian and be embedded in the system. My point of view on the matter is grounded in Moscow, and I am sure that in Yerevan one sees a different picture. I try to be objective and not to oversimplify, echoing accusations about collusions with the CIA; however, I fail to see what the West has to offer that is better than Russia. Even now, Yerevan is interested in the benefits from its engagement in the Eurasian Economic Union as well as role of Moscow in demarcating its border with Azerbaijan, which is critically important. 

So, we talk about the evocation of the CSTO collective defence clause that was not heeded by Russia, sending little more than a fact-finding mission. It looks like the mission of these troops was not to protect the status quo. In your view, are we moving away from the status quo for ever, or is this a parenthesis for as long as the war in Ukraine goes on?

We already see the irreversible change of the status quo since 2020. Of course, since 2023, the change appears more finite. Now, we see the de-Armenisation of Karabakh. The status is no longer a question, no longer part of the agenda. The last leader of the unrecognised Republic of Artsakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, announced on December 22 that the dissolution decree was not valid. However, it is clear, Armenia has no resources and external support to regain control over Karabakh.

We see the surging role of Azerbaijan and Turkey, or part of a phenomenon I call the riot of Small and Middle Powers. These powers are no longer interested in balancing between Washington and Moscow, replicating the Cold War. They have their own agenda. Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan have their own perceptions of how to build the South Caucasus security environment.

The West tries to hold on to its position. We speak a lot in my country about the decline of the USA and EU. Perhaps that is the case, but the Roman Empire was in decline for four and a half centuries. The decline may not be immediate; sure, the United States did not manage to build a unipolar order, but multipolarity is a new reality that presents new complexities and challenges as well. Getting Washington’s approval is difficult, but getting the consent of several powers at the same time – from Ankara and Baku to Tehran and Yerevan – is infinitely complex.

However, I am not at all certain that Yerevan or Moscow is interested in finalising their divorce. Pashinyan blames CSTO, but only tonight I saw news of the visit of the Secretary of CSTO to Yerevan. It is interesting how the perception of Eurasian integration is perceived in Yerevan. Pashinyan started out blaming the Eurasian Economic Union and Customs Union for all sorts of things. Now, he seems more inclined to speak against CSTO than the Eurasian Economic Union. He sees benefits in the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenian officials such as Simonyan and Grigoryan say little of the economic dimension of the partnership with Russia. 

As for Russia’s response to the Armenian crisis, it is important to understand Russia’s limits. Politicians around the Second President of Armenia, Kocharyan,  who view themselves as pro-Russian are not so effective. They have organised mass protests, but not convincingly. They speak of Pashinyan as a traitor, but he is re-elected. The attempted coup by General Gasparyan on the eve of 2021 elections also failed. Moreover, after it, Gasparyan never made any active political endeavours. 

Many of my friends in these circles accuse me of “turning” into a Pashinyan friend. That is not the case. I often criticise him for his absence of professionalism and his non-constructive populism. However, he is re-elected. In 2023, his party won the mayoral elections of Yerevan. Either legally or illegally, no one has been able to shake Pashinyan political dominance, despite accusations of being pro-Turkish or pro-Azerbaijani. The opposition has failed, and Pashinyan is now a necessity, love him or hate him. He is the master of the game. Comrade Stalin used to say that it is not that our writers are drunks or womanisers, but that I cannot find anymore writers. There are no writers at all! 

There is no alternative, and that is a problem not only for Armenia but also for Russian foreign policy in the region. After 100,000 Armenian refugees – incomparable even to Syria – political domination of Pashinyan’s team remains unshakable. 

Let’s talk about Russian immigrants to the Caucasus. There are about 100,000 in Georgia and as many, or even a bit more, in Armenia. Many of them are IT workers that continue to work for Russian companies or remote workers entrenched in the IT digital ecosystem. A friend in Tbilisi said, “We doubled the middle class.” I am wondering if these people are refugees or an integral part of the Russian economy. 

In Russia, we refer to them as “re-locants,” as they are not political refugees. Most of them were not politically active. They left the country mostly for everyday life (and, in lesser extent, ideological) reasons. But if Armenian analysts are positive about these arrivals, Georgians are more sceptical, particularly if they belong to the “collective Saakashvili” camp. Such analysts fear Russian influence, raising the spectre of the Russification of Georgia, particularly when combined with the immigration of Georgians to the EU. The government is more positive, of course. Irakli Garibashvili, for instance, has talked about the positive effect of the new arrivals for the IT sector.

I suppose the key factor for Russian foreign policy is finding a common language with those who have left. They are not likely to be friends of President Putin. They are probably critical of Russian foreign policy. However, they are part of the Russian culture and economy. Many of them are ready to work with Russia, outside Russia. Russia’s language vis-à-vis these people needs to change, as they could be part of Moscow’s “soft power” in the wider sense of the term. The foreign policy needs to be “less personal,” accepting the choice of an opposition abroad without vilifying this choice as much. They can be useful, and how to get there is a matter of discussion. 

There appears to be a split in the Georgian public debate on whether there is an Abkhazian “Crimea B,” in reference to the creation of another Russian base. According to some, this pertains to financial expenditures in Abkhazia. It is taken more gravely by others. What do you believe?      

The Russian approach to Abkhazia is different from Crimea. For President Putin and our elite, the question of Crimea is resolved, closed, and off the table. That is the Russian perception. However, the Russian elite has made clear that they will not stand on the way of an accommodation between Georgia and Abkhazia. The will, interest, and readiness of all the parties to elaborate such accommodations are crucially important in this context. 

I am not sure that this question will be resolved. Georgians have lived a long time without South Ossetia and Abkhazia. My Georgian colleagues tell me that they have lived quite a long time apart. As painful as it is, many Georgians admit that it would be too difficult to reintegrate these regions. Speculation that Georgia needs to find its own Abkhazian Kadyrov is only theoretically interesting but not a real option. Reintegration will be difficult. As for the Azerbaijani pattern, it is not likely to be replicated because that is not the Georgian way. They had a painful experience in 2008. The aspiration of territorial integrity is likely to persist, as many people are emotionally invested, particularly in Abkhazia, but I do not see a speedy resolution. 

Contributed by Ilya Roubanis