Since September 27th, there has been intense fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Many external players have been involved in various roles in the day-to-day events, making it difficult for observers to keep an overview of the broader strategic agendas of those potential powerbrokers. This article is aimed at clarifying the strategic goals of the external states involved and what role they could possibly play in determining the outcome of this current episode of the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

The Regional Powers

Russia

Russia has traditionally been the most influential regional powerbroker prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Yet, its role as sole security guarantor of the South Caucasus has recently been challenged by Turkey with Ankara acting on behalf of Baku on the matter of Nagorno-Karabakh. Indicative of Moscow’s waning influence is the fact that the two ceasefire agreements that Moscow was able to negotiate through the OSCE Minsk Group have broken down shortly after being implemented.

Nevertheless, the country still holds significant influence over the projection of the conflict. Being Armenia’s only reliable military ally, Moscow has troops stationed within Armenia and holds treaty obligation through the CSTO to defend Armenian territory in case of an invasion. Even though there have been tactical skirmishes along the state-border, the scenario of a large-scale Azerbaijani invasion of Armenian territory that would trigger a Russian military intervention remains very unlikely.

Overall, Moscow will continue to try to broker a lasting ceasefire-agreement as it has no interest in the continuation of the current military confrontation. Moscow has used the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the past to exert control over the region not only by keeping Armenia dependent but also by restraining Azerbaijan in its foreign policy as Baku sees Russia as a critical broker in the territorial conflict and a crucial arms supplier. For this strategy to work, Moscow needs to keep the conflict frozen. Should the fighting subsume, it will become increasingly difficult for Russia to balance its relations to both countries.

In the meantime, Russia will play balancer on behalf of Armenia, ensuring that the weaker side will not loose significant ground. The rough terrain of the conflict zone benefits this approach as it denies rapid military advances to the Azerbaijani forces, allowing Moscow to resupply Armenian forces whenever necessary.

Turkey

Turkey’s foreign policy has generally grown more ambitious over the last years and Ankara’s renewed push to foster a closer alliance with Baku is one of the cornerstones of the country’s foreign policy agenda. Turkey has been quite successful in maneuvering the conflict to its advantage since the first round of skirmishes began in July this year, drawing Baku closer, while pushing the most populous and economically viable state in the Caucasus away from Russia.

Ankara’s hawkish rhetoric has been criticized by other major actors as the main driving force behind Baku’s commitment to gain military ground on Armenia and there have been rumors about the exact degree of Turkish involvement in the fighting, ranging from advisory support of the Turkish military to the deployment of Syrian mercenaries.

Turkey seems to be encouraged in its quest to challenge Russia in Moscow’s own traditional sphere of influence after Ankara’s Syrian proxies have been all but defeated by the Russian military intervention in support of the Assad regime. Though Ankara had long-standing relations to Azerbaijan, this is the first time since the Cold War that Turkey has actively dismissed Russia’s role as the veto-power on security issues in the Caucasus.

In addition to this, the heated nationalism and the existential anxieties fueled by the ongoing war rhetoric allow Ankara to present itself as the protector power of the Turkish speaking people in times of crisis. This has been a long-standing interest of the Erdogan regime that goes beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh War and Turkish involvement in the Caucasus at large.

Overall, it is hard to see Ankara change course on its own behalf, unless Armenia makes serious concessions that can be presented as a clear success of the war effort of its ally. Turkey is therefore likely to keep pushing the belligerent rhetoric and might have already committed to more military support in private meetings with Azerbaijani officials. Outside pressure of the international community, especially from its NATO allies France and the US, which Co-Chair the OSCE Minsk Group, might inflict costs that cause Turkey to revert course. Otherwise, Ankara will keep pushing its ambitions until Baku achieves its goals or becomes war weary.

Iran

Prior to the outbreak of violence, Iran tried to keep good relations with both of its neighboring countries, particularly in regards to trade,  in order to avoid international isolation under the “maximum-pressure campaign” of the Trump administration that has put Teheran in a difficult spot economically. With the military confrontation under way, this position became untenable and Tehran shifted towards a more open support of Baku, demanding Armenia to comply with international law and to hand over what is considered Azerbaijan’s territory under legal terms.

This has not always been the case as Iran had a strained relationship with Azerbaijan in the past, though the bilateral relationship has much improved over the last years. The boon of the strained relationship has been the presence of a large Azeri minority in Iran that numbers around 20 million people. The regimes’ biggest worries about its domestic stability and ethnic tensions revolve around the Azeri minority. Tehran has long accused Baku and Turkey of aiding separatist groups and fueling nationalist sentiments among this minority. Nevertheless, Iran seemed weakened and isolated due to its stand-off with the US and an array of regional rivals in the Middle East. The country will likely have to stick to its course of rhetorical appeasement towards the tightening Turkish-Azeri alliance in order to contain the nationalist mood of its own Azeri population. The Iranian regime had a taste of the potential for backlash, after reports of the use of Iranian air space for Russian arms supplies to Yerevan caused widespread Azeri protests.

Even though Tehran has a strong interest in an end of the war, the country lacks diplomatic leverage necessary to bring both sides to the table. Accordingly, Tehran will continue to publicly support Azerbaijan’s territorial claims and pronounce its shared religious affiliations of Shia Islam with Baku. Still, Iran will be cautious not to push a further escalation. Overall, Tehran is stuck in the role of a passive observer with much to lose but little to gain.

Western Powers

United States

Even though the US is one of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Washington has been generally less engaged in the Caucasus since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the country’s strategic interests in the region are marginal in comparison to other places. Though Washington’s new foreign policy focus on traditional great power rivalries includes the containment of Moscow, Eastern Europe has been declared the main theatre for this undertaking. Therefore, a serious willingness to get involved in the conflict is lacking.

Ankara has increasingly been autonomous in its strategic agenda and has moved away from its Western partnerships. Nevertheless, the US and Turkey remain formal allies through NATO. Contrary to Russia or Iran, the United States still holds a certain amount of influence over Turkey, particularly in regard to arms sales and broader strategic cooperation. This could be used as leverage to put pressure on Turkey and progress peace-talks.

On the terms of commitment, there might be a short-term development that brings the Americans back into the equation. The US is the home of one of the largest Armenian diasporas in the world and the war has received a decent amount of public interest. With the House of Representatives being controlled by the Democrats, economic stimulus talks have stalled right before the election. President Trump shifted his attention towards foreign policy in order to present successes to the public and gain much needed momentum for his re-election campaign. After finishing another series of peace-negotiations between Israel and its historical rivals, the Trump-administration seemed to have shifted its focus to the war in the Caucasus. Though the US is generally lacking strategic interest in the region, the executive could try to score political points at home by showing engagement to end the bloodshed.

A third ceasefire-agreement has indeed been negotiated by Washington and was announced on October 25th. If the ceasefire holds this time, it would indicate that Washington did use its sway to convince Ankara to change course. Hours after being announced, accusations by both sides of violating the agreement have already surfaced. For now, its durability must be doubted due to the absence of genuine commitment. The prior lack of a visible American involvement can well be interpreted as part of a long-term trend of strategic disengagement.

France

France is another Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. Nevertheless, the country’s influence in the Caucasus is somewhat remote. Paris will also not be able to channel any EU action towards the issue, as there has been a complete disinterest among mayor European players when it comes to security issues in the region, regardless of the Europeans interest in access to the Caucasus’ energy resources.

Yet, having the largest Armenian diaspora in Western Europe, Paris’ foreign policy is influenced by pro-Armenian sentiment. This is visible in France’s rhetoric that has been highly critical of Turkey’s role in the conflict. An example is Paris’ accusation of Ankara sending mercenaries and military support to the conflict area. Armenian protesters attempted to put additional pressure on the French government, demanding sanctions against Turkey and a direct military involvement in form of a peacekeeping mission. Some political factions also demanded more action and went so far to demand the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. Still, public condemnation of Ankara is likely where France’s engagement will stop for now, as the Macron government has recently dodged questions about potentially sanctioning Turkey over its engagement in the conflict. The withdrawal of French diplomats from Turkey came only after a personal insult against Macron was voiced by President Erdogan. However, even if this diplomatic spat continues, it should not further impact the developments of the negotiations.

Overall, France plays the rhetorical counterpart to Iran and will not be able or willing to neither influence the course of the war nor the peace negotiations. If an agreement will be reached at some point, Paris might play a more active role and aid peacekeeping missions. Until then, developments will be shaped by the two conflict parties as well as Russia, Turkey and potentially the United States.

-Philip Roehrs-Weist

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