Russia’s war in Ukraine and a potentially limited rapprochement between Georgia and Russia on such issues as sanctions could be a major development for Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. Moreover, the economic situation in Russia will also negatively impact the two regions.

For Georgia’s occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 2023 will be a difficult year both economically and politically. This will serve as a further restraining factor for the separatist regions’ ambitions to gain independence worldwide.

The two regions’ problems begin where their hopes for independence lie – in Russia. The latter invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and, instead of quickly imposing a new order, rather undermined its position both economically and politically. It failed to take Kyiv, and instead of further weakening the collective West, it has helped to strengthen it. Never before has the West been so united in dealing with or containing Russia since the Cold War's end.     

This has major repercussions for the separatist entities along Russia’s borders, and especially for Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. The first negative trend is Moscow’s decision to recognize the Luhansk and Donetsk separatist regimes and then annex them along with the other two Ukrainian territories. On the surface, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region should have been happy with what Russia did. But as the war turned into a protracted conflict, Russian weaknesses multiplied.

More importantly, the Kremlin’s decision exposed Russia’s approach to separatist entities: Moscow has not been interested in the defense of breakaway territories but rather was using them for its own geopolitical agenda. The arguments, believed by many in the West, that the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were (at least partially) motivated by fears of Russian speakers being oppressed turned out to be false. Furthermore, claims that NATO instigated rivalry with Russia by bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance were, at best, incorrect.     

From February 2022 on, there are simply too many separatist entities supported by Russia. This lessens the chances for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to gain wider acceptance in the world or even the region. Few if any, especially amid the Western condemnation against Russia, would go for recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, plus the four regions of Ukraine, as part of Russia. Some plans could materialize, but they will nevertheless fall short of what is often hoped for. For example, there is some approximation taking place between Abkhazia and Belarus. The latter’s president visited the region in 2022, while in January 2023 it was reported that Sokhumi’s commercial representation would be opening in Minsk.

Yet the biggest problem for Georgia’s occupied territories is the economic situation. Russia is subject to incremental economic and financial sanctions. With Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region economically fully dependent on their security patron, the expected difficulties in Russia will have a spillover effect on the two territories.

This, however, does not mean that Russia will not be working toward achieving its goals. The agreement on handing over the Bichvinta resort to Russia will likely be ratified, despite all the confusion and outright negative reaction from within Abkhazia. With the continuing war in Ukraine, Moscow will also push for a steady flow of volunteers from the two regions where the war has become extremely unpopular.

Separatist Regions and Tbilisi

Though it is difficult to say what the two separatist regions’ relations with Tbilisi will look like as the geopolitical situation in the region is highly fluid, nevertheless, several major trends could be perceived. First is the emerging understanding between Moscow and Tbilisi. At a time when Russia is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, it highly values Georgia’s non-committal approach to Western sanctions. Anti-Russian rhetoric is also rather low among the Georgian politicians, which for the Kremlin is a highly positive development. Russia, on its side, is careful not to push Tbilisi too hard when it comes to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This tentative mutual understanding could be a critical development for the two regions. They fear that rapprochement between Moscow and Tbilisi might be detrimental to their interests as Russia needs Georgia’s neutral position. And since the war will likely continue for the foreseeable future, Tbilisi and Moscow might further enhance bilateral understanding.

The fate of the two separatist regions is closely linked to Russia. This is seen as a boon in terms of security but also as a huge liability when it comes to the economic stability of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ramifications will be wide-ranging. Corruption and ever-decrepit infrastructure will hamper the two territories’ development. In a way, for Tbilisi, it is an opportunity. In the longer run, some kind of talk could be entertained with Sokhumi. Contingent upon Georgia’s internal economic development, Tbilisi could become more attractive for ordinary Abkhaz and Ossetians. Some experience in that regard is already there. Before 2020, and especially following the pandemic, Georgian medical services attracted numerous residents from the two territories. Similarly, the education sector, with its wide range state-sponsored incentives, has also attracted a large pool of future students.

Moreover, looking at the South Caucasus from a wider regional perspective, the situation is likewise not attractive for Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. The collective West has hardened its stance on the separatist entities. More importantly, however, the EU and NATO now see the importance of the Black Sea and the South Caucasus, signaling that Georgia would have a bigger role for the West. This means potential membership in the EU and highly intensive cooperation with NATO – trends which are unfavorable for Sokhumi and Tskhinvali.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.