With Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine and uncertainties around the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, Armenia’s ties with Russia experience fundamental changes. A new type of bilateral relationship is emerging, shaped by the unfolding great power competition engulfing the South Caucasus.

Armenia, like other South Caucasus states, has entered anera of great power competition. It does not have enough capabilities to shape it, but it does influence it in numerous ways. Great power competition in the South Caucasus occurs when Turkey, Russia, and Iran are vying over strategically critical space for economic, energy, military, and diplomatic influence. There are also the EU and the US, which likewise want to influence the region. It is this accelerated competition amid the changing global order that makes the South Caucasus especially important to the powers outside.

Traditional relations between larger powers and South Caucasus states are changing as a result of the unfolding great power competition. In other words, it is the great power competition in the region that serves as a major reason for the growing ambivalence in relations between Russia and Armenia. Great power competition is about fluidity in relations when no concrete alliances work as they traditionally should. It is more about adaptability to existing challenges and rising opportunities, which means that quite often, official allies can be disregarded.

Armenia has experienced this unfavorable situation in its relations with Russia at least since 2020, when Azerbaijan decisively won the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Ever since, Russia’s position on Armenia’s geopolitical plight has been ambivalent, at least from Yerevan’s perspective. But for Russia, it has acted according to its national interests, which included maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan. The latter has been regarded by Moscow as a more potent actor. As a critical link in the north-south transport corridor between Russia and Iran, a  critical gas producer as well as a major nodal point in the east-west connectivity between Europe and Central Asia/China, these geopolitical factors increased Azerbaijan’s role in Russia’s foreign policy.

Armenia, on the other hand, was seen by Moscow as an actor that has little choice but to follow Russia’s changing calculations in the South Caucasus. Yerevan could voice its displeasure about the state of its alliance with Moscow, but it can do little to force a change on Russia.

Nevertheless, a psychologically important red line has been crossed: Yerevan is no longer confident in its alliance with Moscow. In the latest round of mutual criticism, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan argued in January that Russian troops on Armenian soil do not provide guarantees for the country’s security. Afterward, Yerevan even cancelled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) drills that were planned to be held in Armenia.

What was seen before 2020 as an unavoidable geopolitical fixation on Moscow has now been repeatedly challenged in Armenia. The official alliance between the two was signed back in the 1990s. At that time, the South Caucasus was a very different place – Russia was a very significant power with its military deployed in the region, while Armenia conquered Nagorno-Karabakh in the first war for the area in 1988-94. But as a result of 2020, Armenia has been trying to diversify its foreign ties via rapprochement with Turkey, greater engagement with the EU, and most importantly, a closer partnership with Iran,  an increasingly important player in the region where Turkish influence is on the rise and thus threatens the Islamic Republic’s core interests. 

Yet another reason behind the diminishing understanding between Armenia and Russia is the latter’s declining stature, both as a result of the unsuccessful war in Ukraine and of its lack of funds and growing loss of reputation. This spills over into such areas as the declining Russian multilateralism. Cracks that were always visible within the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) groupings are now becoming more explicit. The immediate cause is Russia’s war on Ukraine. Russia is supposed to be Armenia’s protector, and it has the means to intervene through the CSTO, where Armenia is a member and Azerbaijan is not. Yet, time and again, the Kremlin has turned a deaf ear to Armenian demands that the CSTO meets its obligations. Russia has argued that Nagorno-Karabakh was not Armenian territory and that, therefore, the CSTO security obligation did not apply. Even when Azerbaijan bombed Armenian territory deep inside the country and far from Karabakh itself, Russia merely dispatched a fact-finding mission to the South Caucasus. The message was clear — Russia was not only unwilling but also unable to come to Armenia’s aid.

Russia’s distractions and inherent weaknesses leave a vacuum in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, it is both a dangerous development and a geopolitical opportunity. As previously stated, Armenia's foreign policy is being diversified, and one possible direction for Yerevan is the West. The latter has much to gain if it uses this geopolitical opportunity. In late 2022, the EU agreed to send a special mission to the border of the two countries. It is unclear what the mission might accomplish in practical terms beyond building confidence and perhaps even facilitating the border delimitation process, but the move is nonetheless notable because it signifies a shift from Russian- to EU-mediated efforts. 

Russia has been absent from most of the summits between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders. This worries the Kremlin, but it can do little more than make angry statements from the sidelines. So this may now mark the start of a new era, with the end of the so-called post-Soviet period and Russia’s notion of regional hegemony.

Looking forward, Armenia and Russia are unlikely to return to the previous form of alliance, where Yerevan often unhesitatingly followed the Russian line. Instead, Moscow will have to dedicate more time and resources to persuading Yerevan, whether it is on Nagorno-Karabakh or other matters. Like Azerbaijan, albeit less forcefully, Armenia too, amid the war in Ukraine, is testing Russia’s resolve and ability to protect its once enviable position in the South Caucasus. Armenia likewise wants a diminished Russian influence, though not too much; a complete Russian withdrawal from the South Caucasus would not augur well for Yerevan either.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.