Battle for the Black Sea: Russia Plans to Build a New Base in Abkhazia

| Insights, Politics, Georgia, Abkhazia

The news regarding a new naval base in Abkhazia is not only another measure by Moscow to solidify territorial divisions in Georgia but also a potential threat to pan-Eurasian connectivity, a Middle Corridor project aimed at linking the European Union with Central Asia and China.

The recent revelation in the Russian media that Moscow will allegedly be building a new naval base in Georgia’s occupied region of Abkhazia is viewed as a solidification of Russian power. Yet an alternative argument could be advanced that, if constructed, the new base would rather show that Russia’s position in the Crimean Peninsula might not be as secure as it seems. After all, lately, Ukrainian forces have been more active in targeting Russian naval facilities across the peninsula.

It is unclear whether the idea will be implemented. The fact that the news did not come from the Russian authorities could indicate that Moscow might not yet have clearly decided whether to pursue the project. Indeed, the news came from Aslan Bzhania, the separatist leader of Abkhazia, who mentioned it in an interview with the Russian publication Izvestia. 

The prospective base, if realized, will become the third military installation in Georgian territory and the second within Abkhazia itself, where prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, around 5,000 Russian troops were located. The war in Ukraine might have radically changed this picture, with most the  troops likely being withdrawn to the frontlines. Though for the moment there is no security challenge to the Russian troops, in the longer run, however, the war in Ukraine forces Moscow, at least temporarily, to de-occupy the long-occupied lands.

The Georgian government reacted to the news of the naval base by issuing condemnation and describing it as a blatant violation of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tbilisi also sees it as an attempt to legitimize the unlawful occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia.

Russia's large strategic motivation for this move is evident as it seeks to relocate its naval assets as far away as possible from Crimea, which has recently been under sustained attacks from Ukraine. Western media outlets reported that numerous Russian vessels had been moved from Sevastopol to the port of Novorossiysk.

Building a completely new naval base in Abkhazia would not make any big difference if the infrastructure in Crimea remains operational. Therefore, the need to build a new base probably indicates the challenges Russia is experiencing in its position on the occupied peninsula. If this is the case, Abkhazia is an attractive spot. Occupied by Russian forces since 2008 following a five-day war with Georgia, the region is  strategically situated due to its history as a host to a Soviet naval base, facilitating power projection in the eastern Black Sea region.

In addition to violating Georgian sovereignty, the naval base will also be in close proximity to a significant project the Georgian government is planning to initiate: the construction of the Anaklia deep seaport. Seen as a pivotal element in regional and even Eurasian connectivity, the expanding Middle Corridor is expected to play an ever-growing role in the region. Unsurprisingly, Russia would be uninterested in seeing the Middle Corridor develop  from the south. Indeed, without Anaklia, the ultimate success of the new corridor project will be uncertain. 

There are challenges too for Russia. Abkhazia's location may not be distant enough from Crimea to safeguard against potential Ukrainian attacks, especially given an increasingly large supply of long-range weaponry that the West is sending to Kyiv.

On a more political level, Russia's decision to establish a new base serves as a stark reminder to Tbilisi that Russia remains unwavering in its stance on the occupied territories, despite Georgia's efforts to pursue a more cautious and pragmatic foreign policy towards its northern neighbor since February 2022, when the invasion of Ukraine began.

While the unofficial announcement move is seemingly a signal of Russia's enduring influence, it might also indicate the opposite. Moscow is now compelled to establish a series of bases in the South Caucasus to maintain its position, particularly as events in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated that Russia is in a phase of what could be termed "managed decline" where it can  still skillfully navigate the challenges it is facing but nevertheless is unable to reverse a longer-term development – a gradual rollback of its influence.

Furthermore, for Russia, building a naval base is another step towards turning Abkhazia into an extension of its territory. This follows a 2020 agreement that included various provisions aimed at creating a socio-economic sphere closely linked to Moscow. Recent developments in 2022, such as the transfer of the Bichvinta estate to Russia, reinforce this trend. Ethnic Abkhazians are against surrendering their autonomy to Moscow, but there are few, if any, remaining tools with which the de facto Abkhazian leadership will be able to resist incremental Russian pressure.

While the naval base may offer some benefits to the Abkhazian population, in terms of employment opportunities and increased security, there is a growing risk of Russia potentially absorbing the region. Moreover, as the case of Armenia and the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh show, Russia has not proven to be a dependable ally or a steadfast protector of quasi-states.     

The news ofthe potential establishment of a naval base also worried Georgia's Western partners, who issued a series of protests. NATO is especially concerned as it seeks to counter Moscow’s moves to tilt the balance of power in the Black Sea in its favor.

 

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.

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