Although Armenia is unlikely to completely abandon its Russia-focused vector, it is undeniable that Yerevan is gradually laying the groundwork for closer ties with the EU - a clear sign of a multi-vector approach in the country's history, whose foreign policy has been focused on a single actor since the end of the Soviet Union.

On 5 April, the meeting between the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, took place in Brussels. It was a remarkable and somewhat surprising development, as it is rare for US and EU officials to meet with a country from the South Caucasus.

The meeting did bring some results, such as public support and financial incentives for the Armenian government. When it comes to more concrete measures, the West has limited options. Armenia remains closely tied to Russia, both in security and economic terms. This effectively means that Armenia is unlikely to receive meaningful security guarantees.
It is also unlikely that the meeting will lead to a major shift in Armenian foreign policy. However, it could contribute to what could be called a multi-vector foreign policy, which has become so fashionable in the region in recent years, especially since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Indeed, Georgia has also made strides in this direction, increasingly limiting its fixation on the West and looking elsewhere for economic and political opportunities. Azerbaijan has been playing this game for decades.
The Brussels summit, however, underlined Armenia's stated desire to develop relations with the EU. The real challenge for the EU will be how to coordinate Yerevan's membership in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which remains highly beneficial for Armenia's economy. Perhaps the EU could offer greater economic assistance to Armenia in the future and generally support Yerevan in its plans for closer ties with the Union.

The US role at the summit was more limited. It is seeking stable relations with Azerbaijan after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The economic and security ties between Washington and Baku are far more important to the US than the current Armenia-US relationship. However, the US has a strong interest in widening the gap between Russia and Armenia. It would allow Washington to see Russia further distracted in the midst of its war in Ukraine and, perhaps in the longer term, even to see Yerevan make a U-turn in its foreign policy after signing a major peace agreement with Baku and completing its rapprochement with Turkey.

Armenia's approach to the summit was more an attempt to force Russia to make some concessions, such as pressuring Azerbaijan to refrain from further coercion of Armenia. The latter may also be seeking advantageous arms deals with Moscow and clear security commitments from the CSTO. But perhaps what Armenia has sought most urgently is Moscow's support for the so-called Zangezur corridor, which Baku remains interested in and Yerevan opposes.
It is therefore unlikely that Armenia is expecting something groundbreaking. Its tactics remain the same: testing Russia's resolve, threatening it with a possible foreign policy reversal and perhaps even challenging Russia's military presence in the country.

The summit has naturally worried Azerbaijan and, above all, Russia. Both have difficult relations, to varying degrees, with the collective West, pushing Baku and Moscow to seek closer geopolitical ties and even to coordinate efforts when it comes to Armenia's foreign policy moves.

Indeed, Baku's criticism of Armenia's upcoming summit in the run-up to the 5 April meeting between representatives of Armenia, the United States and the European Union was largely in line with Russia's position. On 29 March, a discussion on the upcoming Armenia-US-EU summit took place between the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry and the Russian envoy, where both sides criticised the summit and argued that there was no place for non-regional actors in peace negotiations.

This is a clear reference to the idea of 'regionalism', which the larger countries in the South Caucasus share with Azerbaijan. Armenia and Georgia appear to be less interested, as evidenced by Tbilisi's refusal to participate in the 3+3 initiative, so strongly promoted by Ankara, Tehran and Moscow.

As the Brussels summit approached, there were reports of increased tensions along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani defence ministry claimed that Armenian forces were firing small arms at Azerbaijani army positions in the Nakhichevan sector. The Armenian Ministry of Defence denied the allegations, as well as Baku's claims that Armenian forces were concentrating on the border. A patrol by the EU mission to Armenia reported no unusual military activity along the border.

Looking ahead, while Armenia's foreign policy remains closely tied to Russia, there appear to be shifts in Yerevan's outlook that could, in the longer term, lay the groundwork for a major reconfiguration of the country's positioning vis-à-vis Moscow and, above all, the collective West. While it is unlikely that Armenia will completely abandon its Russia-focused vector, it is also undeniable that the government in Yerevan is gradually laying the groundwork for closer ties with the EU - a clear sign of a multi-vector approach.

The question is how far Russia can go in pressuring Armenia to change its nascent multi-vectorism. Moscow could use economic measures. Should these prove ineffective, it could even push Armenia further towards the EU. Russia could threaten Armenia by increasing its support for Azerbaijan, but this too carries its own risks: a weak Armenia will be a recipe for continued instability in the region, which needs a balance of power for a more stable geopolitical environment.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads.