Georgia’s internal politics is deeply intertwined with a wider geopolitical context in the region. The country is unlikely to return to its exclusively pro-Western foreign policy. Instead, Georgia will face a dilemma between the pursuit of multi-vectorism and a definitive shift into a geopolitical camp dominated by Eurasian powers.
Following the October parliamentary elections, Georgia has entered a critical moment in its foreign policy as well as its internal politics. Georgia appears to have shifted its focus from EU integration to seeking new partnerships. Georgia has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy, whether it involves closer ties with China or other major Eurasian countries.
The latter is based on the ability to balance between major powers. Lately, however, Georgia’s relations with the EU and the US have considerably deteriorated, which challenges the very idea of a multi-vector foreign policy. Would Georgia be able to sustain the necessary balance in the longer run? This will largely depend on a wider geopolitical balance of power unfolding in the region. One of the key developments that could negatively impact Georgia's fortunes would be Russia's potential victory in Ukraine. Yet another uncertainty is the election result in the US, where Donald Trump would assume office in January 2025.
Indeed, Trump’s return has already diverted Western attention from the South Caucasus and Georgia in particular. Given the fact that the relations between Georgia and its Western allies remain strained, the post-election period will likely see further deterioration in Tbilisi’s ties with Brussels. Although the West may refrain from exerting significant diplomatic and economic pressure on Tbilisi, it is unlikely that both sides will restore their relations to their previous levels.
Instead, one might anticipate the emergence of a more pragmatic and transactional approach in Georgia-West relations. The EU and Georgia, for instance, would likely freeze bilateral engagement while maintaining key benefits like visa-free travel. Similarly, the US is expected to scale back its involvement in Georgia and the broader South Caucasus as its focus shifts to other global priorities such as the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.
Georgia likewise is expected to adopt a similarly pragmatic stance. Concessions such as withdrawing controversial legislation about the so-called “foreign agents law” or battling “LGBTQ+ propaganda” seem unlikely for the moment. Yet, Tbilisi might still try to find some modus vivendi with the EU since the alternative will be a definitive drift into another geopolitical camp. This encapsulates Georgia’s dilemma. While multi-directional foreign policy is likely to deepen by strengthening ties with Eurasian powers like Russia, China, Turkey, and potentially Iran, public opinion strongly favors EU membership (90% support) and opposing alignment with Russia (89% opposition). Tbilisi's strategy in the coming years will be defined by this delicate balance between domestic priorities and external geopolitical pressures.
The wider context is surely critical, but Georgia, though a small actor, has its own agency. Stated differently, the country's internal political developments influence its external behavior. Mapping out the dynamic between the ruling party and the opposition is difficult given the tumultuous nature of Georgia’s internal politics. Yet an overall picture suggests that the period leading to 2028 will prove to be highly divisive and fraught with potential political instabilities.
In the post-election period, Georgia’s opposition remains divided. Although the United National Movement (UNM), Gakharia For Georgia, Lelo, and Ahali, which secured approximately 40% of the popular vote, have united into three major coalitions and the party of the former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia, which transitioned to opposition after leaving his post, they continue to be divided by internal discord. This lack of unity has hindered their ability to challenge the ruling party effectively. Accusations of electoral fraud have failed to galvanize large-scale protests, with demonstrations attracting only a few thousand participants and lacking a clear strategy for legal or street-level opposition.
Moreover, the opposition faces a trust deficit among its supporters. Memories of past broken promises, like the 2020 parliamentary boycott that ultimately ended without achieving tangible results, fuel public skepticism. Adding to this, Salome Zourabichvili, the president of Georgia, who was once seen as a potential unifying figure for the opposition, has struggled to form a cohesive front due to her limited popularity and political capital.
Despite these setbacks for the opposition, Georgian Dream’s position is not without vulnerabilities. The party narrowly secured a majority with 54% of the vote, avoiding the need for a coalition government but falling short of the constitutional majority needed to unilaterally amend the constitution. This outcome underscores the opposition’s ability to attract significant support, even in its fragmented state.
Looking ahead, tensions between the ruling party and the opposition are unlikely to dissipate, with meaningful cooperation between the two sides appearing improbable. The ruling party’s pre-election rhetoric, including threats to ban opposition parties, is unlikely to materialize due to its questionable legality and potential to backfire. Eliminating opposition parties could deprive the ruling party of its quite effective strategy of using the fear of UNM’s return to power to mobilize its base, potentially weakening its position in future elections.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.