The article will explore how Georgia’s ethnic minorities, specifically Azerbaijanis (6.3%) and Armenians (4.5%), comprising 10.8% of the population, play a pivotal role in shaping the country’s political future. Their pro-ruling government stance will be examined, the socio-cultural factors influencing their political behavior, and the implications for Georgia's aspirations toward European integration. As Georgia approaches critical moments in its European integration journey, understanding the role of ethnic minorities is essential for grasping the full complexity of the country’s political landscape. 

Ethnic Minorities in Georgia’s Demographics

Recent elections and political events have underscored the growing significance of minority communities in determining Georgia's outcomes. The vote share of Georgian Dream (GD) was the highest in Ninotsminda, Akhalkalaki, Sachkhere (Bidzina Ivanishvili's home region), Bolnisi, and Marneuli, with 88.1%, 87.7%, 84.3%, 81.4%, and 79.6%, respectively. Ethnic Armenians predominantly inhabit Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki (map 1), while ethnic Azerbaijanis reside in Bolnisi and Marneuli (map 2). In general, GD maintained its most significant advantage in the southern regions and the northern mountainous regions, including Mestia, Lentekhi, and Kazbegi.

Azerbaijanis constitute the largest ethnic minority community in Georgia and are residents of the Tbilisi, Shida Kartli, and Kakheti regions. However, the Kvemo Kartli region, specifically Marneuli, Bolnisi, Gardabani, Dmanisi, Tsalka, Tetritskaro, and Rustavi, hosts the majority of Azerbaijanis. Azerbaijanis have historically inhabited the Ortachala neighborhood and the Meidan historic district in Tbilisi. They are primarily adherents of Shia Islam. As a result of a high birth rate, the Azerbaijani population in Georgia has increased from 140,000 in 1926 to 235,000 in 2014. Conversely, the number of ethnic Armenians in Georgia has decreased from 440,000 in 1959 to approximately 170,000 in 2014. 

Despite the significant Armenian population in Tbilisi, the Armenian community in Georgia primarily concentrates in the south-central part of the country. Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, two municipalities in the south-center of the country, are partially situated on the sparsely populated Javakheti Plateau. Local ethnic tensions and the relatively long-standing tensions between Georgia and Armenia are both contributing factors to the decline in Georgia's Armenian population. After the Russian Empire's collapse in 1918, the two nations engaged in an inconclusive border conflict during their brief period of independence. At that time, the substantial Armenian community in Tbilisi was the target of a variety of forms of persecution. Relations between the two nations have been relatively amicable since their independence in 1991.
Other minorities, including Ossetians, Yazidis, Ukrainians, Greeks, and Assyrians, make up a maximum of 2% of the total population and are not as densely populated as Azerbaijanis and Armenians. They are not as influential and mainly assimilated, residing in the capital. Additionally, there are Belarussian relocators who migrated to Georgia following the political demonstrations and repressions in Belarus in 2020, as well as Russians and a significantly smaller number of Ukrainians who relocated to Georgia following the outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war. 

Markers of Identity and Discord: Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Georgia

For ethnic minorities, there are many identity markers that separate them from the majority, such as food, clothes, language, religion, music, customs, culture, physical features, political views, territorial affiliation, etc. With the exception of language, political beliefs, and religion, these identity markers are essentially alike for the local Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and they are not significantly distinct from Georgians.

As previously mentioned, the Armenian minority was 440,000 in 1959, and in 2014 they were 170,000. It's reasonable to assume that their numbers have significantly decreased since then. One of the main reasons for that is that, despite sharing the same religion and being the first two states that adopted Christianity on the state level, two states before had some contradictions. Before the 2018 Velvet Revolution and later the Second Karabakh War, Armenia’s military alliance with Russia, which supports Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region [South Ossetia], was inviolable. At the same time, Georgia, since independence in 1991, has had close ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s main adversaries. 

Some Armenian political groups and the majority of the Armenian diaspora assert that Samtskhe-Javakheti, also known as Javakhk by radical Armenians, should be part of Armenia, along with Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] and Nakhchivan. However, the Armenian government does not officially claim Samtskhe-Javakheti. Another topic for controversy between Georgians and local Armenians was the Bagramyan Battalion—a unit formed in Abkhazia and predominantly composed of ethnic Armenians living in Abkhazia that fought together with separatist Abkhaz forces during the War in Abkhazia in the 90s. An interesting fact is that, currently, there are around 20% of Armenians out of the whole population of Abkhazia. Another source of resentment among Armenians is the Georgian Parliament's failure to endorse a law acknowledging the 1914 Armenian Genocide, which is again attributable to its close ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

With Azerbaijan, Georgia had better relations since independence. Several important regional projects, such as the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas line, and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, primarily contribute to the lack of ethnic tensions. The second Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his former fellow Politburo member, Heydar Aliyev, then president of Azerbaijan, were in good relations. Saakashvili was also well-known for his sympathy towards Azerbaijanis and Turks, primarily due to his strategic partnerships with these states, which in turn caused disaffection among the local Armenian population. Hence, Azerbaijani-inhabited cities have always demonstrated satisfaction with the United National Movement (UNM), showing varying support for this party in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections.

However, despite positive relations in the energy sector, the Georgian-Azerbaijani border has never been properly delineated. Divided between the two countries, the Georgian David Gareji monastery complex is particularly contentious. For Georgians, the complex holds historical and religious significance, while for Azerbaijanis, it holds significant strategic importance. Moreover, territorial disputes rarely arise over the Zaqatala and Qakh districts of Azerbaijan, which are home to a small Georgian population. 

Barriers to European Integration for Azerbaijanis and Armenians

Since Georgia regained its independence, many Azerbaijanis and Armenians, along with other minorities, have faced social disintegration and underrepresentation in the country's legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The limited political participation for ethnic minorities in both central and local self-government further marginalized them from society and distanced them from the country's main Euro-Atlantic course. For instance, in the Kvemo Kartli region, the local ethnic Azerbaijani community only participates fragmentarily and inadequately in local government, while non-Azerbaijanis primarily hold high positions.

The language barrier is the primary cause of their underrepresentation and hinders their integration of both Armenian and Azerbaijani communities within the state. Many Armenians and Azerbaijanis struggle to integrate into Georgian society because they lack fluency in the Georgian language. They are fluent in their native languages, and they tend to speak Russian more fluently than Georgian. As a result, they primarily receive information in the Russian language from Russian media sources, which are notorious for disseminating disinformation about Europe. Older representatives of those minorities lived in the Soviet Union in the recent past and communicated mostly in Russian. 

Ethnic minority-settled regions were always traditional strongholds of Georgia’s ruling parties. And the issue is still prevalent. Due to the highly Soviet-like voting culture in these regions, voters may have avoided disloyalty or succumbed to the influence of local ethnic elites, who wield enough power to sway voting practices. The legacy of Soviet influence is often associated with nostalgia and collective and shared activities. However, it's important to note that Soviet nostalgia also carries a sense of fear, which the older generation vividly recalls. Consequently, the post-Soviet influence negatively affects these communities' direct cultural ties to Europe and heightens their Euroscepticism.

According to Tea Lobzhanidze, a correspondent for IWPR's Caucasus newspaper who conducted research in the Azerbaijani community following the revolution and the transition from the Shevarnadze to the Saakashvili government in 2003–2004, Azerbaijani representatives asserted that their community, as an ethnic minority, had limited options beyond supporting the majority's will. “We were very frightened when the revolution happened. Everyone anticipated that Georgia's new authorities would exert significant pressure on the non-Georgian population, as expressed by Rafik Gajiev, a member of the non-governmental organization Geirati, which represented ethnic minorities in Kvemo Kartli.

“The government has the power, and Azerbaijanis know that if they don’t support it, they will not be trusted and therefore, in the end, lose out. So we have no other choice,” Kamandar Ismailov, deputy administration head in the town of Marneuli, told IWPR. "We are concerned that the opposition frequently shifts its stance. It can use us, then simply forget about us.” Given that the current opposition is primarily, though not entirely, composed of political personnel from the previous government, this way of thinking makes sense. These days, the opposition is closely associated with the European Union, serving as a champion of European values.

The question arises as to why the previous government was not as successful in implementing inclusive policies that address the specific needs of ethnic minorities and their aspirations within the broader European integration agenda. Understandably, the main goal was to Europeanize the country, not just those regions. Mikheil Saakashvili's government, which came into power after the 2003 Rose Revolution, took steps toward integrating the country's minorities by attempting to enhance the educational system. However, according to the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’s resolution in 2014 (a state report was provided in 2007), the government’s efforts did not constitute an appropriate response to existing needs for persons belonging to national minorities who are not familiar with the Georgian language to learn it. Resources for minority language tuition in the field of education were inadequate. Furthermore, there was limited participation from individuals belonging to ethnic minorities in the country's cultural, social, and economic life, as well as in public affairs.

Georgian media also fails to adequately represent these regions and exhibits extreme polarization, primarily covering them within a political context. This, in turn, impacts the general public's awareness of minorities and their civic integration. There is a need for mutual integration and the exchange of information with both ethnic minorities, as well as an increase in educational and professional exchange programs. Positive attitudes towards European integration, including visa liberalization, economic benefits, and study opportunities in Europe, should receive more emphasis.

By examining the traditionally pro-ruling government voting patterns of ethnic minorities and their frequent alignment with the political establishment, one can conclude that a significant portion of these minorities are unable to benefit from the benefits Georgia receives from the European Union. According to the young people from Marneuli, this is due to the fact that both educational projects and visa-free travel are aimed at more or less wealthy social strata and, accordingly, mainly at ethnic Georgians, with whom they cannot compete due to a lack of knowledge of the language or information. 

Consequently, minorities, particularly those who do not speak English, view the European Union with suspicion. However, it's questionable if the current government has a vested interest in enhancing the EU's image in those regions, given that it has been intensifying political disputes with EU and NATO politicians over the past few years. The non-recognition of Georgia's October parliamentary and December presidential elections in 2024 by Western countries, except for Hungary and Slovakia, has exacerbated political tensions.

The Role of Ethnic Minorities in Georgia’s European Aspirations 

Looking back at the 2024 parliamentary elections, a number of incidents stood out. Quite prominent were incidents in Marneuli, where the electoral commission members were assisting and encouraging voters to vote for a specific party at the polling stations; where Azat Karimov, chairman of the local UNM organization, was beaten while the elections were going on; where Giorgi Gotsiridze, an observer from the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, was assaulted at polling station four in Marneuli; or where at the polling station in the village of Sadakhlo, Marneuli municipality, two persons threw a bunch of ballots into a ballot box. The election precinct N69 later stopped the voting, declaring the results invalid. 

The situation on the elections’ day was quite tense in Samtskhe-Javakheti as well. Journalist Maia Ivelashvili recalls that the presence of government representatives near the polling stations can be considered psychological pressure. For instance, the Aspindza district representative from the United National Movement reveals that the village governor and his deputy stood near the polling station, periodically giving instructions to the electoral committee on how to behave. Ivelashvili says that similar things were happening in the village of Rustavi. 

In the village of Klde, there was an issue with locals' transportation to the election precinct, but this did not pose a problem for those openly supporting the ruling party. According to Ivelashvili, one Javakheti polling station had a video camera so voters could see their candidates. As she recalls, the people in Samtskhe-Javakheti were sometimes unaware of whether the elections were for presidential, parliamentary, or local self-government; they were merely referring to them as "41 elections," which is the electoral number of the ruling party.

These voting practices highlight the limited civic awareness and political engagement of both ethnic minority communities, which stems from deeper socio-economic and educational disparities. As for now, the votes of ethnic minorities serve as a reliable bloc for the ruling Georgian Dream party. That’s why these communities hold strategic importance in closely contested elections and have the potential to significantly influence Georgia's political trajectory. 

Hereby, the paradox of Georgia’s European ambitions is being significantly shaped by communities that may not fully embrace or identify with those aspirations. Currently, there seem to be no effective ways to increase the participation of ethnic minorities in national discussions about European integration unless they receive empowerment through education, economic opportunities, and civic engagement, which could increase their influence in Georgia's political future.

For example, Azerbaijanis express a kind of protest that their university education in Georgia is funded by the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR and that other mechanisms for financing education are limited. At the same time, Armenians prefer pursuing their education in Russia, particularly at universities like the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), which provided funding for over 100 young individuals to study there in 2019. It can be challenging to break free from Euroscepticism when studying in Russia and consuming Russian media. This preference for external educational opportunities reflects a deeper disconnect between these minority communities and the broader Georgian educational system, which fails to meet their specific needs. These choices also reinforce cultural and informational ties to their countries of ethnic origin, further alienating them from Georgia's national narrative and its pro-European aspirations.

The extreme marginalization of those two regions pushes Georgia away from EU integration and toward the "Russkiy Mir." It is evident that these regions are increasingly distancing themselves from the rest of the country, increasing their reliance on state benefits and patronage networks, and becoming more socio-economically marginalized. Does it mean that the more integrated those minorities are in the political processes in Georgia, the more pro-European they will be? Do they really care about the political future of Georgia, or are they mostly engaged with the political processes in Armenia and Azerbaijan? Because they don't speak proper Georgian, the residents of Samtskhe-Javakheti are more likely to absorb information about Armenian issues, such as the post-war adaptation of Karabakh Armenians in Armenia, than they are about Georgia's 2024 pro-EU protests. Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, would likely be more interested in events in Azerbaijan and possibly even in Turkey.

About author: Muraz Safoev is a contributor for Caucasus Watch based in Tbilisi.