About author: Ziya Kazimzada is a Research Fellow at Milliyyet Research Center and now doing his master degree at Masaryk University

The relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran is one that has been shaped by a rich historical background, replete with both periods of amicable collaboration and discordant friction. Since ancient times, the two nations have interacted in a variety of fields, such as politics, economics, culture, and society. 

Despite the fact that Iran-Azerbaijan relations have historically been marked by tensions and turbulence on the international stage, recent events such as the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian crisis, ongoing and systematic protests in Iran, poor institutional coordination, a decline in the number of religious people, and a rise in the number of young people with moderate, democratic political views have brought about new realities that set the two countries apart. For the first time, both nations have publicly displayed their hands while ignoring the sensitivities that they had hitherto avoided. A quick review of the history of Iran-Azerbaijani ties' and a thorough discussion of the elements that make this crisis unique are necessary for a thorough grasp of the current political situation.

From the First Republic to the Second: A Clash of Nations, Narratives, and Dynasties     

Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran underwent a substantial transformation in the early 20th century. The founding of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918, in particular, had a significant influence on the growth of Azerbaijani nationality and identity. Although the Republic only existed for two years, it had a immense effect. Azerbaijan joined the Soviet Union when the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was overthrown in 1920, while Iran remained a sovereign nation. 

In the 1990s, Azerbaijan and Iran started to enhance their economic and political ties as Iran sought to increase its regional influence and Azerbaijan sought to diversify its foreign contacts beyond Russia. Nevertheless, their ties were hampered by the 1988 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan significantly deteriorated while the People's Front was in power in Azerbaijan. The People's Front leaders played a significant role in bringing up the subject of the "split people". As a result, there was a substantial decrease in diplomatic and economic connections during this time, and the relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan became quite tense. Moreover, the city of Shusha, which has significant cultural and historical value for Azerbaijanis, was captured by Armenian forces at a crucial juncture in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Tehran. Due to this circumstance, there has been persistent friction in the relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan, especially in light of the two countries' differing perspectives on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. As a result, the aftermath of this incident continues to have an influence on the bilateral relationships between these two nations, affecting their diplomatic and economic connections and impeding their capacity to work effectively together on topics of shared interest. Moreover, Azerbaijan saw waves of Iranian religious growth, which was carried out at several levels (broadcasting radio and TV programs and sending religious preachers).

Following the inauguration of Haydar Aliyev as the President of Azerbaijan, an informal agreement between Baku and Tehran was established. This accord entailed that Iran would refrain from instigating any religious confrontations within Azerbaijan's borders, as well as from financing and providing support to radical groups in the country. In turn, Azerbaijan agreed not to advocate for "South Azerbaijan" or launch any campaigns addressing this issue. The agreement was colloquially referred to as the "gentleman's agreement" and was not officially documented. It is worth noting that this agreement was reached against the backdrop of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which posed a significant challenge to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, the agreement reflected a pragmatic approach by the parties involved, as it aimed to prevent the exacerbation of tensions and the escalation of the conflict. The effectiveness and longevity of the aforementioned "gentleman's agreement" between Iran and Azerbaijan have been under question, despite its apparent significance as a method of averting religious and ethnic conflicts.

Interstate crises have periodically strained Azerbaijan-Iran relations in recent years, although these crises have tended to be short-lived, and the two nations have subsequently pursued a process of normalization until nowadays. 

Unrest and Opportunity: Exploring the Ripple Effects of Iran's Protests on Azerbaijani Relations and the "South Azerbaijan Issue"

Although tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have always been high, the present situation has become even more complicated as a result of widespread anti-government rallies in Iran that began on September 16, 2022. Demographic shifts in Iran have played a significant role in the ongoing protests. Remarkably, one-quarter of the population consists of children, while a majority (72%) is below the age of 50, comprising individuals born or raised after the Islamic Revolution. Notably, the youth constitute the principal drivers of the current demonstrations. Evidently, the recent protests are poised to have significant ramifications, particularly as the younger generation has grown weary of restrictions and prohibitions, having never witnessed the revolutionary era first hand.

The Iranian administration has chosen to blame outside forces for its internal legitimacy issue in the face of a rising wave of public dissatisfaction. The leadership has consistently claimed that foreign interference is to blame for the latest protests, naming Azerbaijan as one of the primary offenders. Fundamentally, the Iranian regime uses the claim of foreign meddling as a handy tactic to deflect attention from its own failings and produce a "rally behind the flag" effect, which might assist in calming public unrest. 

Recent Iranian military drills near its border with Azerbaijan should be perceived as a response to domestic instability in the country. Iran wants to show that the rallies are motivated by separatist feelings rather than just concerns about human rights by stationing armed units around the border. Also, before the protests, some Iranian officials urged the government not to invest in the Azerbaijani-habited cities because "they will be independent in the future.” Iran may use military drills to divert the Persian populace from participating in the demonstrations in order to keep control over these areas. However, it should be noted that the protest wave was less severe in the northern part of Iran, where the ethnic Azerbaijani population lives, because they think that being a part of the Iranian movement would ultimately lead to the same outcome as that of the Islamic Revolution. 

The Iranian Azerbaijanis initially joined the pan-Iranian revolution against the Pahlavis with the hope of achieving autonomy, but their aspirations remained unfulfilled. Taking into account the past, nowadays the protests in areas such as Tabriz and Urmia are not as robust, and the context of the protests differs. The protestors primarily chanted slogans such as "Freedom, Justice, National Government." Iran's overt support for the Armenians in the Karabakh conflict further exacerbated the discontent of the ethnic Azerbaijanis residing in northern Iran towards the government. It is noteworthy that numerous demonstrations were held against the Iranian government's Armenian policy in the northern regions of Iran, which are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, during and after the war.

Moreover, one of Iran's main worries regarding Azerbaijan is the possible development of a powerful secular state, which poses a serious danger to the Islamic beliefs that form the cornerstone of that country's state structure. Additionally, the majority-Turkic region of the northern part of Iran faces the threat of non-religious sentiment developing there. At the same time, Iran views Azerbaijan's predominantly Shi'a population as a favourable environment for spreading its beliefs and creating local proxies to influence Baku's decision-making processes, similar to several Middle Eastern nations. 

The Huseyniyun armed group's rise, which aims to destroy the government and establish a theocratic Karima state based on Iran, is an example of the lengths to which Tehran is prepared to go in order to undermine Azerbaijani sovereignty from the inside. These influence networks were created using the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) strategy. Due to a number of factors, notably the secular structure of Azerbaijani culture and state, it is doubtful that Iran's proxies will receive significant support from the country's populace. The IRGC has tried to sway public opinion by backing some Azerbaijani troops during the First Karabakh War, but they haven't been able to change the country's image of Armenia as an aggressor against it. This has caused problems for Tehran since, despite the fact that Iran and Azerbaijan both practise Shia Islam, Tehran has long placed a high priority on its relations with Armenia in an effort to offset the increasing dominance of Azerbaijan in the area. Iranian attempts to establish a political or intellectual footing in Azerbaijan have been hampered by the fact that Azerbaijani society is fully aware of these connections between Tehran and Yerevan.

The Iranian leadership is worried that Azerbaijan may use Iranians of Azerbaijani descent to sow internal unrest in Iran and that Azerbaijan will eventually get more engaged in Iran's domestic affairs. The Iranian government may experience a self-fulfilling prophecy as a result of this concern. Baku has also started openly debating the plight of the Azerbaijani minority in Iran, something it had previously ignored as part of a tit-for-tat policy.

With tweets and clips including military and terrorist threats against Azerbaijan, Iranian media has focused most of its effort on criticizing and even openly insulting the Azerbaijani government. The attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran on January 27 was the pinnacle of the informational and ideological conflict. An Azerbaijani security officer died as a result, and two other people were injured. After this assault, the embassy stopped functioning. An abrupt increase in information activity from Iran and its proxies in the South Caucasus followed the attack on the embassy. In less than two months, an attempt was made on the life of Fazil Mustafa, a member of the Azerbaijani parliament who is renowned for being an outspoken opponent of Iran. A number of alleged Iranian spies who were Azerbaijani nationals and had completed different tasks assigned to them by their Iranian handlers were detained by the Azerbaijani intelligence services around the same time.

Caught in the Middle: Azerbaijan's Evolving Relationship with Israel and Its Implications for Iran

A number of worries have added to the difficulty of the historical and geopolitical reasons underlying Iranian-Armenian and Azerbaijani-Israeli ties. Armenia has profited from a strong strategic partnership with Iran, which has also given Iran a way to evade Western sanctions, notably in the area of energy resources, to transit the embargo imposed by Turkey to the west and Azerbaijan to the east.

Particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, the relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel has improved as a result of Tel Aviv's military aid to the Republic of Azerbaijan. As a result of several sabotage strikes on its nuclear facilities, Iran is very concerned about its security as a result of this development. Moreover, Iran has occasionally experienced Israeli rocket fire and shelling while supporting its own soldiers and proxy fighters in Syria. Also, following the border battles, Israeli Defence Minister Benjamin Gantz travelled to Azerbaijan on October 3, 2022, which probably resulted in serious political unrest in Iran. Tehran saw the visit as a danger to Iran's interests given the region's geopolitical and territorial developments. Mohammad Bagheri, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, and Zakir Hasanov, the Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan, spoke by phone on the same day the Israeli team arrived in Baku, which shows that Tehran was angered by the visit.

The next event that worried Iran was the inauguration ceremony of Zangilan Airport on October 20, 2022, which was attended by Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Zangilan, a district liberated from occupation, borders Iran to the south, and Armenia (Syunik province) to the west. Even after the war, Iran was seriously concerned by official announcements and news about a dairy farm to be built by Israeli companies. Statements from officials in Tehran said Iran will never tolerate Israeli presence and activities near its borders. It is clear that Iran suspects that Israel is carrying out some military or intelligence activities in Zangilan and this airport is an important infrastructure facility that can be used for these purposes.

Iran, especially the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is aware of the drawbacks of extreme Persian nationalism, which has been influential in the country for a while, and tries to exit through an intense anti-Israel and anti-Turkish discourse. On October 3, Supreme Leader Khamenei stressed that the concerns should be settled without the influence of foreigners, particularly Israel, in his speech at the military students' graduation ceremony in Tehran, which he attended by video conference. Another important point in this context is that mostly the ethnically Persian army (the Artesh) elements, which were established in the Pahlavi Period, appeared in the maneuver rather than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Since the IRGC, which has influence in the Shiite world through the "axis of resistance" discourse, does not want to give the impression that it fights against predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is possible to say that the latest maneuver is a reflection of domestic political competition in Iran. Of course, Azerbaijan's decision to open an embassy in Tel Aviv also sparked the above-mentioned anger within the Iranian system.

Beyond the Shadow of Russia: The Future of Iran-Azerbaijan Relations in a Changing Landscape

The reestablishment of Russia's status in the South Caucasus currently faces a number of complicated and new obstacles. They include the strategies used by the newly independent republics in the area, whose chances for economic development are usually dependent on the West. Likewise, the United States, as well as other Western and Asian nations, have begun to have strategic interests in the Caucasus region. Oil and gas deposits in the area have also sparked substantial trade discussions and choices on routes for goods to be transported to international markets. 

Iran is concerned that the protracted crisis in Ukraine may result in a deterioration of Russian positions in the South Caucasus. If that happens, Iran believes that Turkish influence in the area will fill the void in strategic might, which would be detrimental to Iranian interests. Russia and Iran have been working together more closely since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, exchanging weapons among them, and Tehran views Russian influence and presence in the South Caucasus favourably. Iran's recent escalation of its hostile behaviour towards Azerbaijan is evidence of this, particularly in light of the Kremlin's failure in Ukraine. Iran understands that if Armenia leaves Russia's sphere of influence, Iran will need to step in to fill the consequent security gap and serve as the new security provider in the area. Iran hasn't said anything about this until now since Russia has offered these security assurances.

Iran and Russia both face pressure from the West in the present geopolitical environment, and it is possible that they may negotiate with one another for some concessions. As a result, Iran hopes to preserve its independence and role as a regional guarantor in the future, even in the event that Russia prevails in the Ukraine conflict. Tehran is aware that at the bargaining table, Moscow may put its interests above its relationship with Iran, and Iran might respond by talking with the West over its relations with Russia, perhaps blocking the supply of drones to Russia.

From Discord to Cooperation

Yet, despite the two nations' views of one another as threats, the ongoing tensions between them have not spiralled out of hand and resulted in armed confrontation. In actuality, a cycle of rising and de-escalating tensions has repeatedly characterized ties between Iran and Baku over the past three decades.

The Republic of Azerbaijan holds a significant place in Iran’s trade relations with the South Caucasus, accounting for over 50% of the total trade volume, surpassing that of Armenia and Georgia combined. This marks Azerbaijan as Iran’s top economic and trade partner in the region. Additionally, Iran is ranked eighth as an exporter to Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan alone constituted about 19% of Iran’s entire trade with Caspian littoral states between March and December of 2022. The maintenance of bilateral trade ties with Azerbaijan is critical for Iran due to the adverse effects of U.S. sanctions, as it cannot afford to jeopardize its leading trade partner in the Caucasus by increasing tensions with the Republic of Azerbaijan.

One important aspect of easing relations between Iran and Azerbaijan is the transit and transportation problem. Significantly, Iran is Azerbaijan's only direct and affordable transit option, giving it access to the Persian Gulf, the Oman Sea, and the Arab region. The importance of this route is further enhanced by the strong and strategic ties between Azerbaijan and Pakistan. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Iran's main commercial and transit route with the heavily populated western areas of Russia, Georgia, and Belarus, is crucially dependent on the Republic of Azerbaijan, taking into account the agreement reached with the International Bank of Azerbaijan, which will allocate a loan of 500 million dollars for the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway. The importance of the Azerbaijan-Iran transit route has increased due to the current geopolitical environment, which includes the conflict in Ukraine, severe Western sanctions against Russia, and the transformation of the preferential trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union into a free trade agreement.

The phone conversation between Azerbaijani and Iranian foreign ministers on February 8 also supported the above-mentioned ideas that, despite the continuity and severity of the crisis between countries, they should leave open diplomatic channels and cooperate at least in economic affairs.

To sum up, the present situation in Iran is characterized by its weak position, which is compounded by its interdependence with other countries, the defensive alliances of Azerbaijan, both de jure and de facto, regional and global economic relations, sanctions, and internal unrest. Despite the fact that it is unlikely that these factors will lead to a full-scale war between the two nations, it is apparent that the heightened tension between the countries will persist and may even escalate, unlike previous conflicts that eventually de-escalated. 

The already tense relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have become even more complicated as a result of the domestic upheaval in Iran and Russia's mistakes in Ukraine. Both sides have taken countermeasures in response to each other's acts, which they both view as threats. Although Azerbaijan and Iran have usually maintained friendly and useful relations, recent statements from Azerbaijan have made it clear that it will not put up with Iran's threats, particularly those that affect the security of its borders. Despite escalating hostilities between Azerbaijan and Iran, both nations stand to gain from maintaining cordial diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, it seems less probable that this scenario will materialize soon.