Amid tectonic shifts in Eurasia, US policy in the South Caucasus both remains based on previous major postulates but also evolves with new developments on the ground.

The US foreign policy in Eurasia is in flux. It is true that it has never been stagnant but rather constantly evolving. Yet the pace of shifts presently taking place across the continent is hard to compare to any previous stages of geopolitical activity since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the continuing crisis over safe shipping in the Red Sea, Iran-Pakistan tensions, and the Islamic Republic’s intent to pressure American military presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East are simultaneous and in many ways interconnected developments that pose fundamental questions about Washington’s posture in the supercontinent. 

The South Caucasus is facing a different set of geopolitical challenges, but given the US’ distraction in multiple areas in Eurasia, its long-term interests in the wider Black Sea region could likewise undergo significant changes. A major constraint the US is facing when it comes to relations with the South Caucasus is an often overlooked factor: geography. Located in the heart of Eurasia, the region has only a limited link to the ocean, which limits Washington’s, as a sea power’s, ability to be physically present in the South Caucasus in times of major conflicts. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 is indicative of this dilemma, when US ships faced problems crossing the Bosporus Strait because of Turkey’s refusal. As a result, the region is important to the US, but realistically, it can do little because of the lack of maritime connectivity.

Yet it is also because of geography that the US is drawn to the region and will likely remain interested in shaping major geopolitical processes. A key country is Georgia, with which the US has been consistent in its diplomacy since the 1990s. Georgia's NATO membership ambitions and national security have traditionally depended on strong ties with the US. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a key goal of US policy has been to help Tbilisi utilize its strategic location as a central hub in the emerging South Caucasus energy and transport corridor. 

The success of this Georgian corridor also supports a broader vision: the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which could become a geopolitical reality under the present favorable conditions. Given Russia’s war in Ukraine, the expansion of the Middle Corridor is realistic, which further increases the US’s interests in the South Caucasus and especially Georgia as a gateway to Central Asia, effectively establishing an alternative trade route for the Caspian states to reach out to the EU.

In the coming years, Georgia might face a choice between two emerging techno-economic blocs across Eurasia: one linked to the US and another increasingly associated with China. Georgian leaders will need to delicately navigate these relations, avoiding provoking China while maintaining traditionally close Western connections. However, as the US toughens its stance on China, achieving this equilibrium will become more challenging. Georgia's strategic location will increasingly mark it as a point of contention. US foreign policy will likely focus on guiding Georgia away from closer links with China and pushing it to align more closely with Western standards and trade practices. Ultimately, this balancing act may prove difficult to maintain for Georgia. The compatibility of its objectives for NATO and EU membership, which are crucial for its geopolitical trajectory, with greater connections with China may pose challenges due to multiple factors.      

Considering other South Caucasus countries, for the US, Azerbaijan bears similar elements of geopolitical importance. It serves as a nodal point for trans-Caspian trade and overall connectivity, and Washington is keen to keep this link safe and operational. Yet relations with Baku have somewhat turned sour over the past few months following the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh entity. For the US, the challenge, therefore, will be how to strike a balance between keeping Azerbaijan close as a necessary partner and managing Baku’s growing geopolitical profile, which could involve a range of steps not aligning with what Washington has become accustomed to.

Armenia could be described as the least strategically appealing country for the US in the South Caucasus. After all, Armenia has not featured in regional connectivity. Closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands since the 1990s, contributed to Yerevan’s isolation and consequent overdependence on Moscow. It is thus in Washington’s long-term interests to facilitate the normalization of ties between Armenia and its neighbors, as it would likely help diminish the country’s need to rely on Russia security-wise.

Overall, in the South Caucasus, the US will have to contend with the three countries’ shift towards multi-vector foreign policy. Georgia has expanded its ties with China, the EU, and the Middle East, while Armenia works on diversifying its military contacts with India, France, and others. Azerbaijan too has close ties with Russia and Turkey and, despite growing mutual distrust, remains an important partner for the collective West. For the US, keeping a balance of power in the region is critical, as is increasing connectivity, as the latter would serve as a viable instrument against any single Eurasian power bent on exclusive domination of the South Caucasus.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.