Budapest is a political force to be reckoned with under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, both in Europe and in the South Caucasus. It has been clear in its approach to Russia and has recently been one of the main supporters of the Georgian Dream government in Tbilisi. Budapest has also built special relationships with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and China.

In an attempt to rationalise and understand Budapest's influence and engagement in the region, Caucasus Watch turned to László Andor, Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), a policy development platform of 77 organisations belonging to the Social Democratic movement. A Hungarian economist, Andor has a strong background in the policies, both national and European, that have reshaped Eastern Europe. He served as an EU Commissioner (2010-2014) after years of experience as a senior advisor to the Hungarian Parliament's Budget Committee and as a member of the Board of Directors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

In reviewing Hungary's role in the region, he argues that it is important to understand Hungarian foreign policy in its historical, geographical and institutional context. Hungary is distinctive in its foreign policy practice, but it is also a 'canary in the coal mine', pointing to what is yet to come. Demonising Orbán is a natural and effortless vocation, but it adds little to our understanding. Hungary's current government is transactional, exploiting global multipolarity with a sense of cynicism that could backfire. But Hungary is not alone in this tendency.   

Hungarian Foreign Policy has been particularly active, with Prime Minister Orbán visiting President-elect Trump and, more recently, even Tbilisi. 

Indeed, there were times when he was perceived as isolated. PM Orbán used Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2024 to show that he cannot be isolated, hosting not merely the informal European Council but also the European Political Community in Budapest last November. He went from Kyiv to Mar a Lago, via Moscow, Beijing and, significantly, the Vatican. Following his visit to President-elect Trump, he spoke on the phone with Putin. 

Budapest is now the proud host of CPAC, an “anti-globalist” forum for the international right from Europe and the U.S. For two successive years, one of the most appreciated guests is the Georgian PM, Irakli Kobakhidze. This year, he was in good company, with party leaders like Geert Wilders and Santiago Abascal, not to mention Congressman Harris, Gosar, and Seif. After the Georgian elections, PM Orbán was quick to go to Tbilisi to legitimise the elections, which the majority of the European Parliament condemned. The question is this: if the political tide is turning to the right, is Budapest showing the way? If that is the case, can anyone blame Tbilisi for investing in its relationship with Budapest? 

PM Orbán went to Tbilisi to validate the elections preempting the European Parliament’s position, one day after the elections. This election outcome has been questioned by many, including many Georgians. However, the war in Ukraine affected public opinion profoundly, and not only in Georgia but also in Moldova and in Romania, for instance. The split results of elections in these countries reflect a kind of intermediate position in a polarized world. 

It’s been 15 years since we branded our relationship with a part of the post-Soviet space as an “Eastern Partnership.” Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, our perception of this relationship has been shaken. As a result, with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia the definition of the relationship moved to the context of enlargement, which in turn has become more a geopolitical concept. It maybe that for Georgia the EU has become too geopolitical while for Ukraine not enough. 

In the third year of the war, we are witnessing a more polarized opinion in the EU between those who want to scale up military support for Ukraine and those who prioritize ending the war through negotiations. In principle, additional support can take many forms. French troops, Taurus missiles, and a broader range of enhanced financial commitment are all being discussed. On the other hand, those who might be ready for an agreement now would need to settle with a consolidation of current battlefield positions. 

As a large share of the citizens in the EU want to see a peace deal soon, it should come as no surprise that this feeling is echoed in states of the former Eastern Partnership, like Moldova or Georgia. While Orbán often talks about the economic benefits of peace, his behavior from the very start has been influenced by other factors, namely his close personal contacts with both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. 

In this context, Orbán acts as a “ringleader” of so called “Patriots” in the European Parliament that have considerable influence in the ultra-conservative far-right fringes of the political spectrum. The fact that he is the PM – we don’t know for how long – enhances his appeal. However, he has no authority to validate (or not) electoral results in Georgia. The European Parliament can articulate an opinion, but Georgia is a sovereign country, of course, while being a candidate for accession. However, the European Parliament’s opinion weighs much more as MEPs are directly elected and act on behalf of their voters. 

Yes, but they have now abandoned their accession ambitions.

In fact, they suspended talks for a number of years, mostly as a reaction to the questioning of their election results. Needless to say, that the soundness of their electoral process does need to be scrutinized. But it is regrettable that the EU is reacting, after the fact, rather than taking steps ex ante, preemptively, to ensure that electoral processes and responsible institutions can be strengthened. 

The situation is anything but rosy when it comes to the credibility of electoral processes not just in Georgia, but also in Romania, where the Constitutional Court first validated, but then annulled the result of the first round of the presidential election. They should have been able to avoid this situation and prevent the use of certain problematic tools of electoral manipulation. We are now in a difficult position to question an outcome, which was defended as legal even by the runner-up of the elections. We need to take lessons from these controversies. There is surely a need for an investigation of all foreign influence. 

Europe awaits the coming to office of President Trump. People assume a “special relationship” could arise if the Breibart club reinstalls itself in the White House. Is Georgia’s alignment with Budapest anti-European or just ahead of the curve? Are we moving towards a European reality in which engaging with Russia while maintaining a “Europe of the states” will be the norm? 

To understand Hungarian policy towards the region the change of guard in the White House is of course significant. The entry of Trump will change a lot in international affairs. However, there is deeper historical context. Hungary’s Eastern Opening dates back to Orbán’s return to office in 2010. This was an opening not only to Russia and the post-Soviet space, but also Asia in general, and Central Asia in particular. While Hungarians are a Finno-Ugric ethnic group, we bizarrely even joined the Organisation of Turkic States. 

So, it was more out of interest to extend economic relations. As trade and investment relations develop, this enhances political relations as well. And I think there can be win-win economic opportunities. So, why not? On the other hand, there are geopolitical considerations too, right? How Hungary instrumentalizes these partnerships and is instrumentalized in turn by its partners is a legitimate question. Hungary may be seen to undermine European interests if it is developing economic relations without considering geopolitics at the same time. 

As for Orbán’s ideological affinity with the new Washington and its significance, let’s wait and see. Some of Donald Trump’s appointments have not been exactly what people expected. In the U.S. as much as everywhere else, there is campaign talk (which aims at gathering votes in sufficient numbers) and there is governance. You come to office, and you need to accommodate to a broader reality.

The relationship between Hungary and the United States has not been good in recent years. The ambassador of the United States in Budapest was actively challenging the government on many grounds, which also involved visits of Republican senators. In the White House, Donald Trump will have to deal with Republican Party Senators who have been critical of Orbán. Even when it comes to political instrumentality towards the EU, Orbán is not going to be the key person. Meloni will. Don’t forget, Italy is five times bigger than Hungary. 

Besides, Orbán is not only considered to be close to Putin, but also close to the Chinese leadership. This might be a concern for some in the White House. Besides, there is a concern for the role Hungary is playing with Serbia in the region – these are the two countries which the Chinese president visited this year in Europe, after France. During the Greek crisis, China acquired the Port of Piraeus, using it as a gateway for EU market via Belgrade and Hungary. In a way, this shows the implications of crisis management with a short-term perspective in the EU. 15 years later, we see the implications. 

Talking about commercial interests and long-term planning, Ukraine first and now Armenia, are exploring changing their nuclear fuel cycle from Russia to the US. Meanwhile, Hungary is planning a nuclear plant with Rosatom. 

Hungary is a country with one nuclear power plant with four blocks. And then there was an announcement 10 years ago, in 2014, before the elections that Rosatom would add two more blocks, but this is not very fast process. So, they made a very early announcement as compared to the needs of Hungary regarding energy consumption. That was more an expression of loyalty, in my view. 

But, if Budapest can project multialignment within the EU, what does that mean for the influence of the EU as an actor in the Eastern Partnership? 

Look, Hungary is not the largest country in the EU. And, on the other hand, we might indeed need to talk again about Eastern Partnership. As we discussed already, people don't talk about Eastern Partnership anymore, because they say that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would need to be linked to enlargement perspective only. Belarus may somehow follow the same line in the future, if they manage to detach from the Kremlin’s heavy supervision. 

It might be the case that the concept of an Eastern Partnership may come back again in the future, but I think not at the moment, since now enlargement dominates the geopolitical dimension, overruling a lot of, let's say, business or economic considerations. 

With your geographic neighborhood, you're supposed to have trade and investment relations. But now, because of the geopolitics, we are basically in an economic Cold War, and nobody knows when this will end. Because of the war, we draw a kind of Iron Curtain again and try to isolate Russia, or at least tell them how much they need to charge for the oil and the gas. This might continue for some time. But then the question is, what will happen after the war? Or more precisely, after Putin.

Orbán has been vocal on this, together with the Prime Minister of Slovakia, because of a pipeline via Ukraine that has covered our oil and gas supply needs. But these are not very large countries and they are not going to drive the process. Hungary and Slovakia cannot derail the European policy process. Look at the question of one year ago, namely the financing of Ukrainian defense. Hungary was alone, basically isolated. Was there a solution? Yes, there was a solution. Orbán alone, or Orbán plus one or two, cannot make a big difference if the rest are united, especially on questions of defense and security. 

You referred earlier to the observer status that Hungary has in the Organisation of Turkic states. This Hungarian multi-alignment includes a sizable country with an enhanced role, namely Turkey. Does this evocation of Turanic allegiance resonate with segments of public opinion or is this only a foreign policy instrument, a courtesy of some kind. 

I think Turkey champions transactional foreign policy, which I am not sure I would call multialignment. It is rooted in crude national interest. Look at what they are doing in Syria. Turkey completely re-profiled itself in the last 30 years. That's because of the geopolitical changes around. Since the end of the Cold War, north of Turkey, the Soviet Union collapsed. East of Turkey, Iraq was destroyed and now Syria imploded too. Erdogan is unscrupulous enough to take advantage of every opportunity. He is an inspiration to people with a similar mindset. 

This transaction-oriented approach manifested itself in the case of Swedish membership in NATO. It was seemingly just a hesitation. In reality, there were, I'm sure, so many secret deals transacted about aircrafts, or whatever, until Turkey and Hungary said yes to Swedish membership in NATO. These countries are smaller than Russia, the United States, but are significant in their own region, particularly Turkey. This strategy may sometimes backfire though. 

Britain beforehand became too transactional on European integration. It backfired because the British people believed their own propaganda, and then they voted themselves out of the European Union. Now they pay a high price. You become too transactional, and you risk losing an alliance. 

Neither Turkey nor Orbán fears this now. Orbán believes he has many friends in the EU and cannot be expelled.  As long as that is the case, he enjoys his transactions around the world. But there is another side of this, a moral side, related to the issue of unity and solidarity, which is a word you don’t find in Orbán’s vocabulary. 

On the other hand, there is now a doctrine, a kind of “grand strategy” of Hungary which has been built around the concept of connectivity. We are a medium sized country of less than 10 million people, which cannot afford to be isolated. This is not about multi-alignment in my view, but the recognition of multi-polarity. The current government of Hungary recognises the world as multipolar. It's just the reality around us, and we seek to optimize our economic relations within this reality, whether it is trade, investment, or joining specific cooperation frameworks.

Now, after its horrendous invasion of Ukraine, Russia is a different matter. But it should not be mentioned on the same page as China which is increasingly assertive but not an aggressor. Clearly, Hungary is not unique in taking this approach. Scholz, Macron, Sánchez, and von der Leyen all went to China. Meloni went with her child. We pretend that is immoral, but is it? 

So, assuming Europe is being divided between those who want to win a war in Ukraine and those who want a peace settlement right now, should we expect that the advent of the Trump administration will tilt the balance? Is there a legitimate fear that those not sitting around the table will be on the menu, if there is a grand deal between the West and Russia? If that is true, do the Georgians have a point when they refer to the “global party of war”?

The relative majority in the European public opinion wants to combine solidarity with Ukraine with negotiations for a settlement. Polls also show that the Ukrainians themselves also would prefer to see the end of the war soon. Even Zelenskyy speaks about a possible end of the war in 2025, but they will have to get there somehow. The question of being at the table or on the menu is, of course, very interesting from a European perspective. It is not only Ukraine that emerges as a divided country, but also the European politics is more polarized now than one or two years ago. 

For sure, Europe cannot risk being absent from the table when important decisions are made if it does not want to end up on the menu. Don't forget that in 2021 – Joe Biden’s first year in office – there was direct talk between Biden and Putin. The two of them talked right above the head of everybody, and that's how we arrived to this war. So, Ukraine was not there, but Europe was also absent, and then Europe aligned itself on the US. I think it was remarkable how united the European Union was from the start of the Russian aggression, simply because the invasion electrified the situation. And then there has been full solidarity, even if some mavericks like Orbán have been talking out of tune. What we are facing now, in my view, is the contradiction between a certain level of commitment which was agreed at the start of the war and the maximalist military goals. The gap between the two was originally not so visible but today it is. 

On the one hand, Germany has been the biggest supporter of Ukraine in financial and military terms in Europe. But Germany refrains from going beyond a certain level, which is symbolized by the Taurus debate but also financial considerations. On the other hand, there are those who would say that the main question is achieving a total military victory. These positions obviously clash. The maximalists do not possess the tools. Those who possess the tools are not maximalists in military sense. A continuing debate is inevitable, unless there is a higher force, which can only be the United States. If there is such a cacophony – I don't want to use the word Balkanization – then the only possibility to create unity is having an external hegemon that we call the United States of America since 1945. 

Armenia is about to open an embassy in Budapest this month. Yerevan does not want a foe in the European Council. Ultimately, can transactions amount to partnerships after all?

The relationship of Hungary with the Caucasus countries is colorful but this does not mean it would always be pleasant. Our relationship with Armenia has been stained by a tragic incident involving an Azerbaijani officer assassinating an Armenian, which I am sure you remember. This was handled shamefully by the Orbán government. We have to work hard to restore confidence with Armenia.

You need to know that in Hungary, although we are not a large country, we have over 4,000 Armenians living in Hungary. These are real people and families.  There should be possibilities to develop cultural and other relations too. So, this reopening of the embassies can only be a good thing, irrespective of everything else. 

After the elections in Georgia, is there a question of the EU giving up on the whole region, leaving Turkey to be the sole regional power?

The EU is certainly not lightening its involvement in the Caucasus region and in fact it is stretching it further towards Central Asia. Kazakhstan and other countries became particularly active in recent years to deepen relations with the EU. Turkey’s regional power games do not compare to the EU’s active international role.

What concerns enlargement itself, we should see how things develop in 2025. What you suggest is that the EU might say that the region is a bridge too far and is not worth the effort, particularly if the Georgians “don’t want us.”  In a way, if it’s just a small delay, that might not be a drama. The orientation is more important than the speed, which depends on many factors. Fifteen years ago, the concept of the Eastern Partnership was not stupid. It just didn't stand the test of the time. It could not anticipate exactly the degree of instability in Ukraine, and the revival of Russian ambition to control the neighborhood changed the circumstances in which this policy evolves. 

Overall, in recognizing this reality, one can neither look at Hungary as something entirely special nor as a canary in the coalmine. There is an element of truth in saying that Hungary is a little bit isolated, and Orbán is a special case. I could argue for such a position at length. At the same time, you have just witnessed this very controversial electoral situation in Romania. You also have the president of Croatia, you have Fico, and the president of Bulgaria; all signaling that the domestic public opinion is not uniform. Which means that south of the Carpathians, people do not see foreign affairs in “black and white,” because our history is different. And who would say that history does not matter? 

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis