After the events in Karabakh and the mass exodus of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, the regional security framework changes. The question is how much continuity and how much change one can expect. Russian peacekeepers will be leaving Karabakh, as their mandate is hollowed out. Public opinion in Armenia is divided on the matter, as they feel Russia has not stepped up as a security provider. Iran only engages when Iranian interests are at play, particularly in Southern Armenia. So, much of what happens next gravitates the relationship between Ankara and Baku, sometimes described as the “one nation, two states” partnership.

Few people understand this relationship better than Ambassador Matthew Bryza. As a former diplomat that for two decades spearheaded Washington’s engagement in the region, he has an insiders’ view of the South Caucasus and knows intimately the inner workings of Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as a deep understanding of how other stakeholders are likely to position themselves.

Ambassador Bryza lives in Istanbul. He joined the US Foreign Service in 1988, rising through the ranks with his first posting in Poland, in the twilight of the Cold War. Shortly after the USSR’s dissolution, Bryza served as a special assistant to US Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering, with a focus on the Russia’s domestic politics and the Republic of Dagestan. With an insight on the Caucasus, he then served as a deputy to Ambassador Richard Morningstar, first coordinating US assistance to the South Caucasus and Central Asia and then co-leading US support for a network of oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to Georgia, Turkey, and beyond. Since, he has been a figure of authority in the region, going on to serve as Director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council in the White House and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on Eurasian Affairs, leading US efforts for a mediated solution in Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 2000s. He served as US Ambassador to Azerbaijan during 2011 and 2012, until he left his post to join the private sector. He then served as Director of the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia, and is currently a Board Member of the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC, both of which are think tanks­­­­­­­­. In important respects, he remains active in advocacy, if not diplomacy.

Leaving history behind and looking ahead: following the consolidation of Azerbaijan’s control over Karabakh, or even because of it, there is a feeling that Baku and Yerevan could be concluding a peace treaty by year’s end. There was a last-minute withdrawal of Azerbaijan from talks in Spain, presumably because Baku does not approve the presence of France. How realistic is the peace treaty prospect in the near future you feel?

This is totally realistic, and I have been saying that to anyone I speak with, whether from the BBC, Al-Jazeera, or CNN. This is the best moment in the history of this conflict in terms of a peace treaty being not only possible but likely. This is what I feel with the experience of working all these years on this conflict, really since 2001, so 22 years.

In all these years, when in the White House we were developing approaches that we could share with our colleagues in the State Department or when serving as the US Co-Chair of the OSCE’s Minsk Group with my Russian and French peers, our goal was always more modest than a peace treaty. Our goal was a framework of basic principles to outline a future peace treaty. But today, the parties are pursuing not just a framework, but an actual treaty.

A lot of Armenians don’t like it. As we well know many of Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political opponents don’t want to give up the fight, and hope eventually for another war, even if the Armenian Army is in no condition today to wage it. They don’t want a settlement because in 5 or 50 years, thy believe there can be another war and these territories can be recaptured. They are holding onto the dream of a Greater Armenia, resurrecting a thousand-year-old dream. They may not be numerous, but they are vocal, and they are potentially instrumentalised by the so called Karabakh clan that used to lead the country. Those “true believers”, or political leaders instrumentalising them, were driving the process in Karabakh until recently. It is clear Prime Minister Pashinyan wants a peace treaty, but these people stand in the way, limiting his room for manoeuvre. As long as the extreme nationalist faction had a military presence in Karabakh, there was little he could do. With those units disbanded, the last obstacle to a peace treaty is removed.

I know the national leaders want to get there. So, much now rests on the political shoulders of Pashinyan. His life has been threatened in the past but as long as he remains in power, I believe a peace treaty can come soon.

Pashinyan’s government is considered pro-Western. I am wondering, given the situation in the Armenian South and Russia’s continuous failure to play the role of the elder brother, it has historically played, does Russia have a security role in Armenia and the region, you feel?

Yes, it does. But I want to clarify that I never expected in this most recent phase of the conflict for Russia to intervene. And those in Armenia that were disappointed were frankly not paying attention to what Russia’s obligations are under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which is to intervene if Armenia is attacked. Of course, Armenia was not attacked, it was Azerbaijan acting to restore its sovereignty, on land occupied by Armenian individuals. And their role in Karabakh was that of peacekeepers not peace makers, and I must admit, the Russians have done a good job as peacekeepers and have played a more constructive role in Karabakh than in Georgia or Moldova.

From my perspective, having played a central role in US policy toward Georgia in 2008, I could say that the Russian peacekeepers there provoked that war. But in this case, they performed pretty well. And in the Trilateral Ceasefire Statement of November 2020, it was specified that Russian peacekeepers would move into specific areas as Armenian soldiers went out. And in this case, the Armenian soldiers never left. In fact, more of them were coming in, meaning there was no role in those areas for the Russian peacekeepers.

Of course, Russia’s influence in Armenia is now undercut. Many in Armenia now profess their hatred for Russia, regretting Russia did not intervene, but as hard as this is for me to say, Russia acted fairly and even-handedly throughout the negotiations of the Minsk Group. As diametrically opposed the US was with Russia over Georgia, we were in lockstep together in negotiating about the Karabakh conflict.

I had a lot of face-to-face negotiations with foreign minister Lavrov, together with my French and Russian Minsk Group Co-Chair counterparts. There was a moment in September 2008 – a month after Russia’s invasion of Georgia – where foreign minister Lavrov hosted us Co-Chairs for a lunch in Moscow. Lavrov seated me directly across from him, which was contrary to diplomatic protocol because I had the least seniority as a Minsk Group Co-Chair among the three of us. The first course on the menu was kharcho, a Georgian soup. I looked at Minister Lavrov and said, “You are serving a Georgian soup.” He smiled and explained, “I want you to understand we are not warmongers, and we are here for serious work in pursuit of peace” between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But when Pashinyan said in 2019 that Armenia rejected the “land for peace” formula that had been the foundation of settlement talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for decades and had instead embraced a new formula of “new wars for new territories,” he essentially provoked the Second Karabakh War by killing the Minsk Group’s negotiating process. Putin, I am certain, was not happy, he did not want a full-scale war, which I think he felt Pashinyan provoked, with some pressure from the Armenian National Committee of America. Be that as it may, it is true that Russia lost prestige in Armenia. But it is also still super powerful. Much of Armenia’s international borders are protected by the Border Service of the Russian Federation, while Armenia’s airspace remains integrated with Russia’s. And so much of the strategic assets and sectors of Armenia’s economy are Russian-owned. So, I think that when the dust settles, Russia will not go away. But neither Russia nor France has the credibility of an honest broker anymore, which completely undermines the Minsk Group.

When I was talking about the Armenian disappointment with Russia, I was thinking less of Karabakh and more of the infringement in Southern Armenia, in Syunik, where Pashinyan expected Russian intervention as this is Armenian sovereign territory.

Why? Nothing happened there. You know, the November 2020 Trilateral Ceasefire Statement calls for what the Azerbaijanis provocatively call the Zangezur Corridor. Pashinyan agreed to that. And then he refused to implement it. There has been no action other than building infrastructure in Azerbaijani territory and pushing Armenia to follow through, saying “you agreed to this, let’s get moving.” That Corridor will never be controlled by Azerbaijan. I have never even heard senior Azerbaijani officials talk about that. The corridor will remain sovereign Armenian territory and be under Armenian control with Russian peacekeepers ensuring that it remains safe for transit through it. So, that’s where there is potentially a big future role for Russia.

So, my understanding is that Azerbaijanis always framed this as a “corridor-for-corridor” discussion. The Trilateral Agreement made reference to communication lines, not a corridor. Azerbaijan demanded an equivalent to the Lachin Corridor, explicitly defined as “a corridor.” So, if the Lachin Corridor is gone, because Karabakh is under Azerbaijani control, then why are we talking about Syunik and Zangezur at all? Words matter here, don’t they?

I don’t see that they do in terms of the use of the word “corridor”. The Lachin Corridor is sovereign Azerbaijani territory, just as the Zangezur Corridor would be sovereign Armenian territory.

Yes, but “corridor” is a term with extra-territorial sovereignty implications, like the Danzig corridor.

Maybe, maybe not. But there have been no indications in the Trilateral Ceasefire Statement [signed by the President of Russia, the Prime Minister of Armenia, and the President of Azerbaijan] and subsequent trilateral agreement on joint infrastructure projects that the Zangezur Corridor would constitute anything other than sovereign Armenian territory.

The question remains. If there is no corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia is not the provision of a corridor linking the Nakhchivan exclave to Azerbaijan gone by equivalence? 

The Lachin Corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia has not ceased to exist. The few Armenians remaining in Karabakh are using it now, and hopefully many more will use it in the future.

In any case, I think there is a chance that the Zangezur Corridor could lose its economic relevance once there is a peace treaty, because it will be more cost effective to upgrade existing infrastructure connecting Turkey, Nakhchivan, the rest of Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Before the latest developments in Karabakh, I know of very senior Turkish officials – very senior – that were making precisely that point to their Armenian counterparts.

If Azerbaijan is willing to subsidise rail, road, and natural gas pipeline connections, which it seems it is, this could lead to large-scale private and public investments that could generate jobs, economic growth, and prosperity while reintegrating Armenia into the regional economy via its transportation connections with Azerbaijan and Turkey.  This could even enable establishment of an organized industrial zone that is located on the territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan (specifically, in Nakhchivan), and Turkey. I have been exploring this vision with the business community in Turkey since the end of the Second Karabakh War, but there are just too many economic unknowns now, and the economics have to work. I recall how 12 years ago or so, international energy companies were reluctant to commit to Nabucco, a big new natural gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe, because they foresaw that Azerbaijan would not be producing enough natural gas to fill the pipeline. But SOCAR said, “We will pay for it,” and they did, which led to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline or TANAP, which is functioning today and in fact needs to be expanded to handle additional volumes of Azerbaijani natural gas. And TANAP essentially became the portion of the Nabucco pipeline on Turkey’s territory. The same pattern could be replicated with an organized industrial zone and infrastructure through Syunik, meaning, with government support, perhaps in a public-private partnership, then maybe it will make sense.

So, President Erdoğan was recently in Nakhchivan. He said, “we will build the Zangezur Corridor,” then comes back to Ankara and he says that “yes, but that Zangezur Corridor can go through Iran. So, getting a bit deeper into this question: does Ankara and Baku see eye-to-eye on this question?

Yes, I viewed this statement as a negotiating tactic by President Erdoğan, in coordination with Baku, to nudge the Armenian side to stop dragging its feet on the Zangezur Corridor in the “you are not the only game in town” spirit. Azerbaijan has been using transportation lines via Iran to connect with Nakhchivan for years now: that’s how energy and trucks get there. I know Ankara and Baku are on the same wavelength there, yes.

Going deeper still. There is a pipeline project between Turkey and Nakhchivan. Is this about closer ties with Iran, hedging against Iran, or both. Do you feel Turkey is building a buffer with Iran or developing interdependence? 

Neither. The project has been in preparation for three years. Take it at face value. While the Azerbaijanis and the Turks want to decrease Nakhchivan’s dependency on Iran, this is not an aggressive move.

There is no hidden agenda here. Azerbaijan won the war. It is now the status quo power and wants to cement its gains. Nakhchivan has symbolic importance as the home region of the Aliyev family. The government of Azerbaijan wants energy security for Nakhchivan. It is possible to use these links to connect Armenia to this region bringing joint growth for all three relatively underdeveloped regions in Nakhchivan, Turkey, and Syunik. So, why not. I actually think that’s the plan.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying to figure out how to deal with Iran, which has made provocative troop deployments toward its border with Azerbaijan, repeatedly in recent years. But President Aliyev has had a measured tone regarding Iran in recent months and I think Baku and Ankara understand that Iran is not seeking armed conflict with Azerbaijan but is seeking to warn its own and large ethnic Azerbaijani population against separatism while also protecting what Tehran views as Iran’s economic interests in Armenia.

So, given recent developments in Erbil (Iraq), it may be fair to say that Ankara and Tehran often see more eye to eye than with Washington on certain issues. I am wondering whether Ankara can contain escalation between Tehran and Baku at the moment, particularly following the recent mobilisation of Iranian troops along the Armenian border. Do you feel Ankara can de-escalate?

I met with the foreign minister of Turkey recently. I did not sense such ambition at all. Yes, as you noted, Iran did move troops toward its border with Azerbaijan, and flew UAVs along the border. So, there are periodic upticks in tension and then decreases. While Azerbaijan welcomes Turkey’s broad and deep support, it of course does not need Turkey to protect itself or to decide to de-escalate with Iran. Azerbaijan makes its own decisions.

There is a famous saying throughout the region that Azerbaijan and Turkey comprise of “one nation, two states.” This saying is interpreted a bit differently in each country. In Azerbaijan, the key idea is “Hey, we are one nation, so treat us like your brothers and sisters and provide us benefits”, whereas in Turkey the emphasis is on being two separate states, implying that despite warm emotions toward each other, each country must above all pursue its national interests, which sometimes diverge from those of the other state. These are subtle but important differences.

When it comes to Iran, I do not see a role for Turkey moderating Azerbaijan’s behaviour. Azerbaijan manages this with care and prudence. I perceive no significant tension between Baku and Ankara on how Azerbaijan manages its relations with Iran.

So, there is an Iranian Consulate General in Kapan, there was the Iranian military attaché present as Karabakh Armenian forces surrendered their arms, and there was a mobilisation of the Iranian military along the Armenian border. So, it looks like there is Iranian consent for Karabakh and a red line over Syunik. Iran says “Karabakh not our business, but Syunik is our business.” Do you feel that Iran is stepping in to replace Russia?

No, Iran is primarily worried about its Azerbaijani population, which was cheering as Azerbaijan advanced during the Second Karabakh War. So, Iran advanced military forces toward Azerbaijan not to communicate geopolitical ambition but to tell their own ethnic Azerbaijani population, “Do not even think about autonomy or a new legal status.”

Having said that, Iran does worry about the Zangezur Corridor either cutting off its access to the north into Armenia and beyond, perhaps worrying the corridor could somehow evolve into sovereign Azerbaijani territory and block Iran’s own access to Armenia. So perhaps Tehran’s military movements are also in part a statement aimed at deterring Baku from even considering a politically significant move such as claiming sovereign control over the Zangezur Corridor, with Iran’s leaders using the threat of using military force as a diplomatic tool, in keeping with the famous principle of the great 19^th century politico-military strategist von Clauswitz that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

But I don’t see Iran trying to fill a political vacuum in the South Caucasus left by a weakening Russia because there isn’t a political vacuum there: Turkey is present. I am disappointed the US as active there as it once was, but the US is far away from the region and Russia and Turkey are right there.

Turkey and Azerbaijan have a different relationship to Israel. That is obviously an Iranian concern and that could be of renewed significance given what is happening right now, not only with Iran’s advanced nuclear programme but also with the question ‘what happens next’ as Israel calls on its allies for help. So, do you feel in view of that Ankara and Baku see eye to eye.

Yes, there is no grand conspiracy here. Ankara really wants to normalise relations with Israel, and Erdoğan and Netanyahu recently met in New York, during which they reportedly spoke at length about a potential natural gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey. But after the Hamas attack and massacres of Israeli civilians, we live in a different world.  But remember that UAVs from Turkey and Israel helped enable Azerbaijan to win the Second Karabakh War in autumn of 2020, which suggests significant coordination among Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Israel.

It is true that Azerbaijan and Israel have a close relationship. Baku has every right not to be as supportive of the Palestinians as Turkey chooses to be, but I detect no tension between Ankara and Baku on Israel-Palestine.

Until now, that is the situation. But this is a historical inflection point. Who knows if Erdoğan can sustain this normalisation trajectory with Israel. Turkey’s initial reaction to Israel’s response to Hamas’s unprecedented terrorist attack was measured. But now Israel is going to invade Gaza. The US is also deploying its largest aircraft carrier combat group to the Eastern Mediterranean. We cannot foresee where this will all go.

Interview conducted by Ilya Roubanis